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Abstract  
This paper tries to assess the Ethiopian monetary policy, in order to investigate the prospect of 
inflation targeting. The paper starts by reviewing the literature on the evolution of Ethiopian 
monetary policy and Macroeconomy. This is followed, by the requirements of adopting inflation 
targeting and the practical experience of inflation targeting countries; finally the paper focuses 
on the requirement to have a stable and persistent relationship between the policy instrument 
and price level. Vector auto regression model with some monetary policy instrument and 
macroeconomic variables was used. To explore different transmission mechanism i have 
analyzed the Granger causality, impulse response, and Variance decomposition. Result showed 
that, there is a weak relationship among prices, interest rate and exchange rate channel. The 
paper, therefore, recommended it is not the right time to adopt the full-fledged inflation 
targeting. Rather, better try to adopt inflation targeting as an implicit policy. 
 
Key words: inflation targeting, Vector auto regression, impulse response, variance 
decomposition, and granger causality. 
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Research question  
 
1.  What is the reason for the current objective of the monetary policy in Ethiopia? 
2. What is the current performance of Ethiopian monetary policy in terms of   achieving its 
stated objective? 
3. Is there any room or need for another monetary policy?  If any is it applicable with the 
current economic scenario? 
Although there is a general agreement on the neutrality of monetary policy in the long run, 
there is a disagreement on its impact in the short run. Accordingly while the neo classical 
economists believe that systematic monetary policy will not have an impact on the real 
variables, to the contrary the neo Keynesians economists believe that systematic policy will 
have an impact to the real variables. When we see empirical results it is not clear cut. But 
the one thing they both agree is that monetary policy can be used to keep price stable (not to 
be a problem by itself). However the disagreement of economists will not end here, beside to 
the above disagreements economists do not agree which specific monetary policy we have 
to use even to make the monetary policy of being a problem by itself. 
 
Taking the above arguments in to account this paper will try to assess the current monetary 
policy in Ethiopia and evaluate its performance towards achieving stability of price and 
exchange rate. At last but not a least this paper will try to see if there is a need for another 
monetary policy to achieve the above objectives. 










1. Part : 1 introduction 
2. Part : 2 review of monetary policy in ethiopia  
3. Part : 3 review of emperical and theoretical litrature  
4. Part : 4 methedology and data  
5. Part : 5 estimation of the model 
6. Part : 6 conclussion and recommendation 
The Following models will be used in the analysis  
1. Interest rate transmission mechanism  
2. Exchange rate channel  
3. monetary channel  
 
  Appropriate econometric methodology will be used to estimate the models and data from 
data set national bank of Ethiopia and IFS will be used. 
 
1. The current monetary policy is not  fostering  sound financial system and economic 
growth  
2. The current monetary policy is incapable of keeping stable the price level and the 
exchange rate. 
3. Some Africa countries like Ghana and south Africa are able to apply inflation 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
There are some disagreement regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy in both long run 
and short run. However, before discussing different empirical findings both who support and 
argue the effectiveness of monetary policy, it will be helpful to give the theoretical explanation 
of monetary policy. Monetary policy1 is a practice in which the monetary authority or the 
national bank of a country manages the supply of money, the cost of money or rate of interest, 
and availability of money to achieve a set of objectives (price stability, exchange rate stability, 
full employment and high rate of growth). 
 
In 1990’s, there was a wide disagreement between economists over monetary policy 
effectiveness over the long run. Although it is difficult to suggest the causality, McCandless and 
Weber (1995) observed that there is a high correlation between money growth and inflation. In 
their study, they also found that there is no correlation between inflation, money growth and 
economic growth. This finding was supported by Kormendi and Meguire (1984) that found no 
long run relationship between money and output growth using the sample of 50 countries. 
However, Baro (1995) found that a negative correlation between inflation and output growth. 
 
Since the early 2000, economists were coming in to an agreement, regarding the long run 
impact of monetary policy. That is they started to conclude that monetary policy will not have 
long term impact on real economic variables. However, they still do not agree over its impact to 
the real economic variables. Some of them assume monetary policy can stimulate an economy; 
while some of them believe in its neutrality. Nevertheless, there is a general agreement; 
monetary policy can be used in controlling inflation pressure. That is we can control monetary 
policy of being a problem by itself. 
 
                                                          
1
 According to , MILTON  FRIEDMAN (1968)  in the paper called " the role of monetary policy " 
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However, the disagreement among economist with regard to monetary policy do not stop here; 
There is also another disagreement among economists over which monetary policy to use and 
which of them are effective taking in to account the condition of countries. The most Common 
monetary policy used by different countries is monetary targeting, exchange targeting, price 
level targeting and inflation targeting. In line with these monetary policies, they use different 
instruments such as the discount rate, open market operation, and mandatory reserve rate 
requirement. However, the ultimate objective of the monetary policy differs from country to a 
country where in some countries they put stable economic growth and low unemployment as 
their ultimate objective others put low inflation as their ultimate objective. The setting of the 
objective is directly related with the perception of monetary policy impact. 
 
However, starting from 1990's on and the start of new millennia inflation targeting monetary 
policy has been increasingly viewed as a superior monetary policy framework and was highly 
praised by economist and policymakers at the same time. Because of its massive potentials as 
an effective instrument of managing inflation, countries that have adopted it never turn back; 
with the exception of Slovakia, Finland and Spain which joined the euro currency area. Inflation 
targeting monetary policy regime tries to make public a projected, or targeted inflation rate and 
then tries to bring actual inflation towards the target through the use of interest rate changes 
and other monetary tools. 
 
According to Svensson (1999) inflation targeting (IT) framework stipulates exceptionally clear 
goals for monetary policy, establishes measures of transparency and accountability, and defines 
responsibilities. It is, however, characterized as constrained discretion’ because it requires the 
central bank not only set out clear targets, but also to use appropriate instruments to hit the 
target, Fischer (2000). Loayza and Soto (2002) examined that although the term inflation 
targeting is frequently used by policymakers’ bankers, politicians and scholars quite a lot 
features of this monetary regime and its effects on economic performance remain subtle. After 
facing moderate, but, persistent inflation rates for over twenty years, developed countries have 
controlled and maintained inflation at historically low levels in recent years. Statistical 
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Evidences have shown that Inflation targeting frameworks has often been adopted in 
economies even if they do not have stable inflation historically ; this is typical particularly for 
countries of Africa and Latin America who were seen as an archetype of unceasingly high 
inflation. For example, Brazil and Chile had an inflation rate of 19 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively, prior to the adoption of inflation targeting, and they have had a success story in 
controlling inflation using inflation targeting. 
 
However, until now the number of countries who adopted fully fledged inflation targeting is 
exceedingly few and it is mainly adopted by developed countries. Although there are some 
developing countries that started to apply the monetary policy, still the number of developing 
countries who applied is unusually small. Their inability is originated by the requirements for 
the successful adoption of the fully fledged inflation targeting2. Those requirements are: 
predictable relationship between consumer price index (CPI) and policy instrument variables; 
independence of the central bank and absence of fiscal dominance (central bank must not have 
the burden of financing deficit); putting in place a well defined and only one objective (inflation 
stability); have a high degree of transparency and accountability; have strong financial market 
who can absorb the allocation of public and private debt. 
 
The paper tries to evaluate Ethiopian monetary policy and its prospect for inflation targeting. 
Taking in to account the ultimate objective of this paper is to check applicability of fully fledged 
inflation targeting in Ethiopian monetary policy. In investigating the monetary policy, I will try 
to see the effectiveness of the transmission mechanisms. Since, one of the requirements for a 
successful adoption of inflation targeting3 is the effectiveness of the interest rate transmission 
mechanism; I will try to see the effectiveness of the interest rate transmission mechanism, 
exchange rate transmission mechanism and monetary transmission mechanism. Although, 
                                                          
2
 Full-fledged inflation targeting is when countries or national banks commit clearly to inflation target and 
underline the commitment by a transparent monetary policy framework. This in effect reduces the time 
inconsistency problem a Central Bank faces but, at the same time, reduces also the leeway of monetary policy to 
stabilize aggregate output. This policy is seen to exist in Sweden, the UK, Norway, Czech Republic, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand. 
3
 Shehu Usman Rano Aliyu, a. A. (2009) 
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there are also other transmission mechanisms which are indispensable to look, I have only 
concentrated on the above transmissions. 
 
In order to achieve the stated objective, I took consumer price index (CPI), gross domestic 
product (GDP), broad money (M2), Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), and Treasury bill 
rate (T-BILL) as the main indicators. The above indicators were taken as the best proxy for price, 
output, money supply, exchange rate and interest rate respectively. In addition, some 
exogenous variables are also included (export, fed rate and international oil price).  
 
To keep the stream of the paper I have organized the paper as the following way, in the first 
part there is the introduction and trays to show the motivation for the paper. In part two, there 
is Evolution of Ethiopian monetary policy and macro economy in historical perspective. In the 
third part of the paper, there are Empirical and theoretical literatures related with inflation 
targeting and monetary VAR, while the fourth part presents the research presents the data 
selection and methodology. At last but not the least, the fifth and the sixth part present the 















CHAPTER TWO:  EVOLUTION OF ETHIOPIAN MONETARY POLICY 
AND MACROECONOMY 
2.1 Evolution of Ethiopian monetary policy 
The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) began operation in January 1964, after the enactment of 
the establishing proclamation 206 of 1963. The proclamation gave the bank juridical 
personality, raised the Bank's capital to 10 million the then Ethiopian dollars and granted broad 
administrative autonomy. Following the enactment of the proclamation the National Bank of 
Ethiopia was given the following specific objectives: 
 
 To achieve balanced and sustained economic growth and development, by fostering   
conducive monetary, credit and financial conditions.  
 
 Ensuring the level of money supply is generally in line with developments in the macro- 
economy and taking action in the exchange rate of the foreign currency for the purpose 
of preserving the purchasing power of the national currency.  
 
 Through the implementation, of a prudent market driven interest rate policy, Encourage 
the mobilization of domestic and foreign savings and their efficient allocation for 
productive economic activities.  
 
 Facilitating through appropriate policy measures to the materialization of capital and 
financial markets that are equipped of responding to the needs of the economy. 
 
However, the renewed banking and monetary proclamation No. 99 of 1976 came into action 
following the socialist economic Principle that the country adopted and tried to shape the 
Bank's role accordingly. Accordingly the new proclamation allowed the Bank to participate 
actively in national planning, specifically financial planning, in collaboration with the other state 
institutions. The supervisory area of the bank was also expanded to incorporate other financial 
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institutions such as credit cooperatives, insurance companies and investment-oriented banks. 
Furthermore, the new proclamation introduced the new Ethiopian birr in place of the former 
Ethiopian Dollar. 
 
To reduce the deficit and combat inflation, the government introduced a contractionary fiscal 
management policy in the 1980s. The government reduced the budget deficit to an average of 
l4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the five years ending in Ethiopian fiscal year 
l988/89 by borrowing from local sources. For example, in Ethiopian fiscal year l987/88 domestic 
borrowing financed about 38 percent of the deficit. Ethiopia was also forced to take measures 
to cut back spending on capital and to lower inflation. Nevertheless, price ceilings, official 
appreciation of the birr, and a freeze on the senior government officials wages was unable to 
control inflation. By 1988 inflation was averaging 7.1 percent annually, but it turned sharply 
upward during 1990 due to the government involvement in war in different fronts; 
expenditures increased and were estimated at 45 percent by mid-1991. In addition to the 
above, money supply(M2), defined as demand deposits with banks (except that of the National 
Bank of Ethiopia)and currency in circulation, rose with the expansion in government budget 
deficits, which reached about 1.6 billion birr in Ethiopian fiscal year 1988/89. In Order To help 
resolve the budget deficit problem and other economic difficulties, Ethiopia relied on foreign 
aid. 
 
Inflation was not a significant problem in Ethiopia until 2006, but after 2007, there was a high 
growth in the inflation rate and the government started restriction on credit availability to 
investors in order to control inflation. This policy measure helped inflation to stabilize, and in 
response the government lifted the credit restriction in 2008/09. However In 2010 
management of macroeconomic variables was problematic because of the sharp depreciation 
of the national currency (birr) and rising level of inflation. The government tried to deal with 
inflation through different combination of monetary policy instruments, i.e. the contraction of 
money supply growth and availability of credit to investors and households. The government 
devalued the national currency by 20% in 2010 with the objective of increasing the level of 
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external reserves and increase earnings from export. This devaluation made to aggravate 
inflation through imported inflation (fuel and some other consumer products). To alleviate the 
side effects of the policy measure, the government intends to use monetary policy measures to 
keep inflation below 10% starting in 2011 and through the duration of its five-year plan. Many 
scholars and economists blame to the governments cheap monetary measure in order to boost 
the economic growth. 
 
Based on government’s growth and transformation plan for the year 2010 to 2015, the 
government delineated a monetary policy that set a target for the next five years of below 10% 
inflation. Money supply is expected to grow at a level consistent with real gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth targets, annual inflation targets (CPI and PPI), and at the economy’s 
monetization rate. However, restraining inflation to a single digit from its current double digit is 
a colossal challenge for monetary policy. The projected high GDP growth and investments 
required to achieve it will have an impact on foreign exchange demand and could lead to a 
further depreciation of the Birr. 
 
2.2 Evolution of Ethiopian Macroeconomy 
Like other developing economies, Ethiopian economy heavily depends on agriculture; 
accordingly it constitutes 42 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) and generates more than 
80% of the export commodity of the country. Not surprisingly more than 80 percent of the 
population sustains their life in the sector. Coffee is the foremost agricultural export crop, 
contributing for about 65% ten years ago. However, this sharply decreased to only 26% of 
Ethiopia's foreign exchange earnings, because of the drop in coffee prices since the mid-1990s 
and increases in other exports. Other traditional principal agricultural exports are hides and 
skins, leather, oilseeds, pulses, and the traditional "Chat," a chewed narcotic leaf. Sugar and 
gold production have also become significant in recent years. 
 
When we see the economic growth of Ethiopia unlike to the end of 1990's and the beginning of 
the millennia and before, Ethiopia is showing enormous economic growth since 2003 to date. 
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Surprisingly, Ethiopia continued to register the fast growth for the last seven years. In the 
considered years, Gross domestic product (GDP) was growing by more than 10% with the 
exception of the year 2008. In 2010, the GDP growth remained strong at 11.5 %. This Growth is 
driven by the service sector (15%), followed by the industrial sector (12.5%) and agricultural 
sectors (9%). The service is leading the growth of GDP due to the involvement of private 
financial institutions (banks, insurance and microfinance), hotels and restaurants, real estate 
and public services. 
Table 1 Real GDP growth 
Period  Real GDP 
growth 
Real GDP growth contribution to GDP growth 
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
1998 5.2 1 0.2 3.9 - - - 
1999 5.9 3.4 0.6 1.5 2.2 1.8 9.5 
2000 7.4 4.8 0.7 -0.2 10.6 4.8 3.8 
2001 1.6 -1 0.8 1.9 -2.1 5.1 -0.5 
2002 -2.1 -4.3 0.9 1.3 -11.6 5.5 4.4 
2003 11.7 8.1 0.9 2.3 17.3 6.8 5.8 
2004 12.6 6.4 1.3 5.1 13.5 9.4 12.8 
2005 11.5 5.1 1.4 5.4 10.9 10.2 13.3 
2006 11.8 4.3 1.3 6.3 9.4 9.5 15.3 
2007 11.2 3.2 1.3 7 7.5 10 16 
2008 9.9 2.5 1.3 6.1 6.4 9.9 14 
2009 10.4 3.2 1.4 6 7.6 10.6 13 
2010 11.5 4.69 1.53 5.26 9 12.5 15 
Sources: national bank of Ethiopia 2010 -2011 annual report   
 
In spite of the above growth in the economy, Ethiopia continues to struggle with the challenges 
of high inflation, budget deficit, and exceptionally low international reserves. This can be seen 
from the table below, starting from 2002 onwards we see that both the GDP deflator rand CPI 
increasing in an alarming rate. GDP deflator and CPI slowed in 2009; however, this did not last 
long, and CPI increased vigilantly in the following year. At this period, the government took 
some measures to decrease the inflation rate; including restriction in the credit availability to 
investors and consumers, through the regular banks and micro finance institutions.  
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Table 2 Alternative inflation measure/indicators of Ethiopia  
period GDP deflator CPI 
general inflation food inflation  Non food 
1998 0.7 4.3 9.9 -2 
1999 6.9 5.4 7.6 2.5 
2000 -5.8 -0.3 -1.7 1.4 
2001 -3.6 -10.6 -19.1 0.3 
2002 12.8 10.9 21.5 0.2 
2003 3.9 7.3 11.5 2.2 
2004 9.9 6.1 7.4 4.4 
2005 11.6 10.6 10.6 7.1 
2006 17.2 15.8 15.8 13.5 
2007 30.5 25.3 25.3 12.5 
2008 24.4 36.4 36.4 23.8 
2009 3.5 2.8 2.8 18.2 
2010 3.2 18.1 18.1 21.8 
Sources: national bank of Ethiopia 2010 -2011 annual report   
  
If the government growth and transformation plan (GTP) is successful, the growth prospects for 
2011 and 2012 are likely to be as positive as in 2010. The GTP plan calls for the agriculture 
sector to become the principal source of economic growth. However, unlike the previous plans 
which solely depend on agriculture, the government intends to promote industrialization 
through increasing exports and import substitution. Therefore, based on GTP the economy is 
projected to grow at an average annual rate of 10% in 2011. Industry and services are expected 
to show an average annual growth of 20 and 11% respectively during the planned five-year 
period of the government, while the agriculture sector is expected to grow by 8.1%.  
Before 1991 the source of government budget deficit was the excessive militarization of the 
country to fight with Somalia 1979 and internal civil war with Eritrea and Tigray. In the stated 
time Ethiopia was importing weapons from united soviet Russia and was unable to get financial 
aid from western countries because the ideology of the military junta . However after the over 
through of the military government the military expense of the country sharply decreased and 
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there was an abundant flow financial aid and loan grants to the government to finance the 
development activity of the country. 
Therefore Ethiopia’s external debt declined to a historic low in 2006/07. Ethiopia received debt 
relief of 21% of GDP in 2006/07 mainly because of the World Bank’s 100% cancellation of the 
country’s debt to the International Development Association. Total external debt fell sharply 
from 85.4% of GDP in 2002/03 to 11.7% in 2006/07 before steadily rising to reach 14.8% in 
2008/09 and hitting 22.2% in 2011. This trend is expected to remain intact in 2012. Similarly, 
the external debt service ratio declined from 7.3% in 2002/03 to 1.2% in 2007/08. However, it 
has risen to 3% in 2008/09 and remained at the same rate of 3% in 2010. One aspect of 
Ethiopian debt worth watching is the rapid rise in debt owed to non-traditional partners such as 
China. Unlike to the traditional way of debt to western countries the debt of Ethiopia is with 
china and some other BRIC4 countries. This is because the western means of loan requires a lot 
of bureaucracy, however, in the case of china and some other BRIC countries it is relatively very 
easy. 
In a nut shell In terms of the structure of GDP, the dominance of the agricultural sector changed 
in 2009 as compared from 2005.5 Thus, in 2009 the most dominant sector of the economy in 
terms of its share was the service sector at about 43.9% of GDP. This is followed by the 
agricultural sector with a 43.2% share in GDP. The industrial sector’s share remained largely 
unchanged from last years with its share of GDP at about 13.0%. The manufacturing sector, 






                                                          
4
  This is a group of emerging countries with strong economic growth ( brazil , Russia ,India and china ) 
5
  African Economic Outlook 2012 - © OECD 2012 
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Inflation targeting in emerging and developing countries  
As a conventional monetary policy regime, Inflation targeting was first introduced in New 
Zealand in 1990. Since that time, it has been implemented by several countries around the 
world. In the beginning of 1990, the countries that started adopting inflation targeting to their 
monetary policy were developed countries. The performance of inflation targeting countries 
has been remarkably beneficial. It seems that, inflation targeting countries have significantly 
reduced their inflation rate and inflation expectation from what could happen if they did not 
introduce inflation targeting. (Mishkin 1999, 595)  
 
By observing the above results, after the end of 1990 and the beginning the new millennia 
emerging and developing countries started to introduce the inflation targeting to their 
monetary policy. As a result, result countries like Chile, Colombia, South-Africa, Thailand, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Guatemala, Romania, Serbia and Ghana introduced inflation 
targeting starting from 1999 to 2007. However, despite the above development, formal 
inflation targeting is not yet common in African countries, with only Ghana and South Africa 
having officially adopted the framework at the current time. (Svenson 2010)  
 
Emerging and developing countries adopting the IT regime saw greater falls in average inflation, 
growth volatility and inflation volatility than those who did not. Here, caution were made 
Taking in to account there may be the possibility of intelligible mean reversion effects for the 
case of inflation and its variability, since they were initially higher in countries belonging to the 
IT group. Therefore, even after controlling for mean reversion, inflation fell more vigorously in 
the IT group. (Carols 2005)  
 
Besides the above finding the same paper, by the same author, proof that IT will not have a 
negative impact on the economic performance of the targeting country. Unfortunately to 
previous researches and fortunately for IT, the increase in GDP growth in the IT group was, in 
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fact, even modestly higher than the increase in growth experienced by non targeters. (Carols 
2005)  
 
Given the growing number of developing and emerging countries adopting inflation targeting, 
the key challenge for those countries is endogen-sing the frame work to their domestic 
condition. The second vital challenge, applicable for all countries, is how to take better 
explanation of vulnerabilities in the inflation target frame work and financial structures. (Scott, 
roger 2009) 
3.2 Implementing inflation targeting in emerging and developing            
countries 
Emerging and developing countries, introducing inflation targeting, encounter a number of 
hurdles that differ in character or design from those faced by developed countries. Calvo and 
Mishkin (2003) jot down five vital hurdles for developing countries. These include weak public 
sector financial management; weak financial sector institutions and market; low monetary 
policy credibility; extensive dollarization of financial liabilities; and vulnerability to sharp 
changes international investment sentiment and in capital flows. 
 
However, this does not mean the above challenges are the only challenges those countries can 
face in the way of their implementing inflation targeting. (Scott roger 2009) These include 
uncertainty about the structure of their economies, the monetary transmission mechanism and 
the cyclical condition of the economy than is typically developed countries inflation target. In 
the next paragraph, I will discuss in detail the challenges that will be faced by developing 
countries in adopting inflation targeting. 
 
Bringing public sector finance in to order: fiscal dominance, the treat of it, may undermine 
inflation targeting. The success of inflation targeting or any other monetary regime requires the 
absence of fiscal dominance. Therefore, implementation of inflation targeting must be 




Objectively, fiscal policy, which is essentially incoherent with the inflation target, can prompt an 
exchange rate calamity just as it may escort to the collapse of an exchange rate peg. However, 
it is also possible that adoption of inflation targeting may help as a channel for public sector 
financial reform accurately by stressing the inconsistency of fiscal indiscipline with the objective 
of low and stable inflation. 
 
Adoption of inflation targeting, as economic reform package, complicates monetary policy 
conduct. A reform like this affects long run equilibrium values and dynamics of macroeconomic 
variables because this reform is structural change by nature. This structural change in turn will 
make it exceedingly difficult to forecast with precision to the economic development. However, 
such problems do not necessarily prevent inflation targeting Batini and Laxton (2005). 
 
When formulating and implementing inflation targeting, it is required to take in to account, 
weak financial sector institutions and markets. According to Laurens and others (2005), the 
weakness of financial institutions can affect the relative efficiency and effectives of monetary 
transmission through different channels, needs to be taken in to account in policy formulation. 
 
In case of emerging and developing countries, the role of exchange rate is crucial in inflation 
targeting frame work. According (Taylor 2001) inflation targeting central bank should not react 
to exchange rate movement, he assumes it will be reasonable only, if the outlook is it will affect 
inflation and output. However, the global financial crisis has revealed the significance of 
financial vulnerability and high dollarization for emerging and developing countries inflation 
targeters. Mishkin (2003) pointed out that far-reaching dollarization of the economy can 
significantly change the transmission of monetary policy. A number of highly Euroized Central 




3.2.1 Financial Stability and Inflation Targeting 
Central banks are forced to reassess the relationship between monetary policy and financial 
stability after the global financial crises. Here, the solution to the problem is related with the 
diagnosis of the cause of the problem. The cause of the crises is explained differently by 
different researchers. The first argument is by Taylor (2009) monetary policy in USA and euro 
area was too loose for too long. The second argument is by Borio, and Lowe (2002) the crises 
are due to monetary policy in the leading economies being too narrowly focused on medium 
term inflation and paying little attention to financial development and their implication of long 
term inflation. The final argument is that, financial sector deregulation and regulatory arbitrage 
led to a loosening of monetary conditions in the United States and elsewhere; that was not 
effectively taken into account in setting monetary policy. 
 
There is an analogous in the reaction of monetary policy, between the development in financial 
stability, and exchange rate development. From this perspective, one could argue that there is 
no much benefit for the monetary policy maker to react directly to the development in the 
financial stability. If we assume the financial sector development is captured in macroeconomic 
analysis and forecast of the national bank, one can argue that, some benefit can be gained from 
an indirect response to the extent that financial sector developments affect the outlook for 
excess demand and inflation. However, the fact to the matter is, most Inflation Targeting 
central banks’ analytical frameworks are incomplete with regard to macro-financial interactions 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Bean (2004). 
 
It was reviled that inflation targeting countries to give greater attention to Macroeconomy and 
financial stability after the global crises. Traditionally all inflation targeting countries, 
macroeconomic models used in monetary policy analysis and forecasting do not have complete 
representation of financial sector. In addition, there is no representation of interaction with in 
the financial sector. Therefore, solving such problems is not easy; however, incorporating 




There must be alternatives for central banks to react directly to financial stability indicators 
Borio and Lowe (2002) or Cecchetti and others (2000). This means that, some financial stability 
indicators would be incorporated directly to the central bank reaction function. If the financial 
sector, stability is adequately represented in the model of the central bank model, reacting to 
financial problem directly will have a problem. However, if, it is not adequately represented, 
reacting directly to financial problem will be helpful even if it is not for all financial shocks. 
However, due diligence must be made in determining which financial model to represent and 
how to include them in the central bank reaction function Walsh (2009). 
 
The other complication is extending the inflation targeting horizon, so as to be able to take in to 
account long term inflation risk due to asset price cycles. This method is less mechanical as 
compared to reacting directly to asset prices. However to rip this advantage some challenges 
must be addressed. Specifically Lengthening of the forecast horizon and appropriate timing of 
actions need to be solved. In addition to the stated issues, policy communication also needs to 
be strengthened Bean (2004) and Gruen and others (2003). 
 
At last but not least emerging and developing countries could face a problem, in introducing an 
element of the price path targeting as an alternative to inflation targeting. If successfully done, 
this may extend the monetary policy horizon in a way that ensures a long term commitment to 
price stability. In line with the above, Walsh (2009), stated that price path targeting would have 
the far-reaching benefit in influencing expectation, which will help decrease adverse effects of 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
 
While the above complications are more or less related with the implementation of inflation 
targeting in emerging and developing countries, there are also other issues required to be 
addressed before adopting inflation targeting as a monetary policy. The other aspect, which 





3.2.2 Conditions that have to be in place at the time of the adoption of inflation 
targeting: 
Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997) stated that before a country started adopting inflation 
targeting it needs to satisfy two most essential conditions. First, a country should have a central 
bank with a degree of independence and capable of conducting its monetary policy. However, 
this may not mean the central bank should have full independence. Nonetheless, a Country will 
have to exhibit no significant symptoms of fiscal dominance in order to comply with this 
requirement. The second requirement according to these researchers is the country should not 
have any firm objective to target the path or level of any other nominal variable by the 
authorities. 
 
In the same manner career, Schaechter, stone and Zelman (2002) stated three prerequisites 
before adopting inflation targeting as the monetary policy. First, the central bank is required to 
have a defacto mandate to pursue its objective and the public must be informed about the 
inflation target. Second, it must be ensured not be subordinated, inflation target, by another 
objective. At last but not the least, they must ensure the financial system is developed, and 
stable enough to implement the frame work. 
 
The finding of Batini and Laxton (2006) also supports what was stated by the above authors 
with its own category and explanation. Therefore, they have categorized the requirements in to 
four: one, the central must have full legal independence and be free from fiscal and political 
pressure that creates conflicts with inflation objective. The next requirement is the ability of 
central banks to have inflation forecasting and modeling ability and the required data to 
implement inflation targeting. The other relevant requirement is that, prices must not be 
regulated; the sensitiveness of the economy to commodity price, dollarization and exchange 
rate must be minimal. The last requirement is the banking system should be sound, and capital 




3.2.3 Instrumental issues in inflation targeting 
Inflation targeting central banks commit themselves usually over a one-year horizon to a target 
measure of inflation. However, the target level and the horizon of the target differ from country 
to the country; especially in the case of which target to target there is no consensus. Some 
countries use core inflation (which ignores consumption expenditure on energy and food items) 
while others focus on the total consumer index (CPI). Gomez, González, Melo and Torres (2006) 
suggested in developing countries with inflation targeting regimes Using total CPI may be more 
appropriate for two reasons. First, the budget share of household food expenditures in 
developing countries is exceedingly higher than in developed countries. Second, there is high 
volatility in the food expenditure as compared to the developed countries in the developing 
countries.  
 
Currently countries like Brazil, Colombia, , Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Poland 
and Switzerland use total CPI; and others such Australia, Canada, Korea Republic, Thailand and 
Iceland use core inflation (Aboal et al. 2004, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000; Debelle, 1997; Mishlin). 
The main assertion in favor of using total consumer price index (CPI) is that the general public 
and economic agents create expectations and make decisions based on total consumer price 
index (CPI). Furthermore, according to (Minilla et al., 2004) economic agents and the general 
public are affected by the whole basket of consumption, not just by the core items. On the 
other hand, supporters of using core inflation argue total inflation price index (CPI) is affected 
by exogenous factors, which cannot be controlled by the monetary authorities ; and it is 
essential to have less sensitive measure to short-term price changes and more reflective of the 
long-term trends. 
 
Most inflation targeting developing and emerging countries set their target based on total 
consumption price index (CPI). This is reasonable, because their share of food expenditure in a 
household is high and most contracts are indexed to total CPI. In a nut shell, in developing 
countries total CPI (general CPI) is more representative of in measuring the change in the 




The other instrument aspect that is required to be determined is the optimal inflation rate. In 
most of the developing and emerging countries, there is no agreement about the optimal 
inflation rate for their economy. The disagreement on a quantitative value makes the choice of 
targeted variable’s nature random. Nonetheless, there seems to be a general supposition that 
developing and emerging countries should probably plan at attaining a medium term rate of 
inflation. Therefore, the medium term target has to be somewhat higher than what the 
developed countries target (between 4 and 8 percent per year). In addition, it must be 
tolerated for the policy maker to set his inflation target within the band to help Accommodate 
with larger supply shocks (Masson et al.. 1997). 
 
3.3 Inflation targeting in practice  
Currently Central banks from developed, emerging and developing countries adopted inflation 
targeting. These countries constitute from all the continents. 
Target level 
According to the new Keynesian paradigm and Friedman rule, inflation rate should be zero or 
negative respectively. However, in reality we observe, all inflation targeting countries having 
positive targets. This is due to different reasons one,  statistical reason i.e. actual inflation tend 
to be overstated by 0.5 percentage points, the second reason is due to the argument that the 
cost of deflation is greater than the cost of inflation. At last but not the least, if there is a down 
ward nominal wage resistance, a positive inflation target is desirable to avoid the risk of 
deflation. 
 
The table below shows that, the numerical inflation targets in developed countries all have 
inflation targets between 1% and 3%. Korea Republic is at the top of this narrow range, with a 
target of 3% plus or minus one percentage point. Some emerging countries also have inflation 
targets in this range; 2% in the Czech Republic, 2% in Peru; and 2.5% in Poland. Additional three 
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countries Mexico, Hungary and Chile have a target of 3% and Colombia had a target range of 
2%–4%. Only two countries have a target above 5%, namely Indonesia and Ghana with a target 
of 6 and 10 percent point respectively. 
Target horizon 
The second noteworthy aspect to see, in inflation targeting countries, is the target horizon. In 
almost all countries with inflation targets of 3% or less, the target horizon tends to be medium 
term. This is because medium term targets have the advantage of observing inflation 
expectation closely and allow the inflation rate to diverge from the target in the period of 
volatility in the economy. The other possible reason is the length of the transmission 
mechanism. That is, the interest rate transmission mechanism may not be effective in the short 
run. 
 
The other target horizon is annually, this is often set where a disinflationary strategy is 
employed. In emerging markets, there is often a quicker transmission mechanism, so a shorter 
horizon policy instrument is advisable. Beside to the above reason this horizon can be seen as 
advantageous for the purpose of accountability. The prominent country with this regard is 
Brazil. 
Target measure 
All inflation targeting countries use the headline consumer price index (HCPI) as their 
operational target. This is due to three reasons: First, CPI is available on monthly level, whereas 
GDP deflator is available only quarterly. Second, the public is familiar with headline consumer 
price index (HCPI). For instance, Korea used the core measure of inflation until 2006 but due to 
the above reason they changed it in to headline CPI. The third reason is, the core inflation 
measure exclude food items because they are volatile; But, doing so means excluding about 





However some countries try to substantiate their headline CPI by core inflation as an indicator 
of underlying inflationary pressures in the economy. Therefore Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Turkey all publish forecasts of core 
inflation in addition to headline inflation. 
 
Point or range targets a point target will help to have a clear objective to pursue. However, it is 
extremely difficult to achieve the target month in month out. This will have the tendency to 
erode the confidence of the public. Therefore, a point target will be preferable when the 
volatility of inflation outruns is wider than the width of a narrow band. The other alternative is 
the target range, by this target any one can see whether the target has been hit or missed and 
allows output to stabilize; But, Ranges can also pass on the sense that the central bank has 
wooly control over the inflation objective. 
 
As we can see, from the table, 17 of inflation targeting countries express their target as a point 
with a tolerance band. Five central banks (Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) have restrained point targets while the other five countries have a target range. 
Table 3 inflation targeting countries and their detail information 


























Albania  3% (±1) HCPI
10
 2009 3.7 3.40 NA NA 
Armenia  4.5 % (±1½) HCPI 2006 9.35 9.35 Medium 
term  
NA  
Australia  2-3% HCPI 1993 2.0 4.03 Medium 
term  
None  




Canada  1-3%  (2% 
central value) 
HCPI 1991 6.9 2.23 Six to eight 
quarters   
none 
                                                          
6
 Gill Hammond ,2012 , “ state of the art of inflation targeting -2012” ,centre for central banking studies , page 9 
7
 Roger, Scott, March 2010,”inflation targeting turns 20”. The inflation rate at the time of adoption for Slovakia is 
not there, because Slovakia abandoned inflation targeting after joining the euro currency.  Beside to that I did not 
incorporate Spain and Finland since they abandoned it for the same reason. 
8
 Sarwat , jahan , “ inflation targeting : holding the line “  
9
 Gill Hammond ,2012 , “ state of the art of inflation targeting -2012” ,centre for central banking studies , page 9 
10
 Where HCPI is head line consumer price index  
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Chile  2-4% HCPI 1990 3.2 2.97 Two years  Exchange 
rate  








money supply  
















Israel  1-3% HCPI 1992 8.1 2.62 Within 
Two years  
Exchange 
rate  




New Zealand  1-3% HCPI 1990 3.3 4.03 Medium 
term  
None  












money supply  
 








Slovakia  0-2%  HCPI 2005 - - - Exchange 
rate  
 









Sweden  2% (± 1%) HCPI 1993 1.8 2.10 Two years  Exchange 
rate  
Switzerland  0-2% HCPI 2000 - - - Money 
supply  













Sources: petursson, Thorarinn G. (2004), formulation of inflation targeting around the world, monetary 




3.4 Experience with inflation targeting in Africa: South Africa and Ghana 
Currently there are two sub-Sahara Africa countries which adopted inflation targeting formally. 
These contraries are South Africa and Ghana which adopted inflation targeting in 2000 and 
2007 respectively. Therefore, in order to shade some light to my analysis, I will present some 
literature regarding their achievement and challenges in detail.  
South Africa 
In South Africa, when inflation targeting was introduced in 2000, it was decided that a modified 
version of the consumer price index (CPI) labeled the CPIX, would be used to calculate inflation 
rates. The CPIX was calculated in a way it excludes the financing component of housing costs. 
The rationale for excluding mortgage interest from the CPI is that most South Africa mortgages 
are flexible rate mortgages. It means that if these dynamics affects the measurement of price 
inflation, then the central bank could respond to increase in market interest rate by increasing 
its policy rate. That is the central bank will exacerbate the increase in interest rate. In addition 
to that, it was also decided the target range to be 3% to 6%. James Heintz and Le´once 
Ndikumana (2011) The trend of inflation shows that the Reserve Bank of South Africa was able 
to meet its target about half the time since announcing the policy of inflation targeting. 
Particularly the period from 2003 fourth quarter to 2007 first quarter was the most successful 
period in terms of achieving its target. This period was also accompanied by relatively strong 
economic performance and high average rate of GDP growth, compared with earlier years pre 
inflation targeting and post apartheid era. James Heintz and Le´once Ndikumana (2011) the 
other aspect of inflation targeting worth answering is, has the inflation-targeting regime in 
South Africa influenced expectations? Aron and Muelbauer (2007), in their review of monetary 
policy in South Africa, mentioned facts that inflation expectations, mainly in wage setting, come 
out to be historically based, and are frequently not forward-looking. These findings would 
indicate that expectations among South African will be difficult to shift simply by announcing a 
target range of inflation. At last but, not the least, the same authors found that after the 
introduction of inflation targeting there was a significant improvement in the transparency of 
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monetary policy. However, achieving better transparency does not mean there will be an 
increase in the perception of credibility of central bank policy through influencing expectation. 
Ghana 
Ghana adopted inflation targeting officially in May 2007. In the initial period, the target was 
jointly determined by the bank of Ghana and the government. In effect, they determined the 
target rate to be from 7% to 9 %. Amoah and Mumuni (2008) in measurement of the price they 
used to target inflation by excluding petroleum price and utilities. The argument here is the 
same like that of South Africa energy prices can be quite volatile and clearly represents a non-
monetary source of inflationary pressures. However, excluding energy component from CPI 
does not entirely eliminate the influence of changes in energy price on inflation. Pollin et al 
(2008) The trend of inflation in Ghana is still increasing from 10% in 2007 to 20% 2009, 
however, this mainly because of imported inflation. It means that the central bank is missing its 
target. 
 
 Unlike to the other inflation targeting countries, when the inflation target is missed, the bank 
of Ghana does not produce an open letter of a formal report explaining the deviation. The bank 
simply communicate its policy through a press release after the monetary policy committee 
meetings, publishes routine reports and maintaining information in its website. Therefore, it is 
unknown how effective these means of communication are in influencing expectations and 
enhancing policy credibility. Amoah and Mumuni (2008) However, here what we have to take in 
to account is it is too early to judge the inflation targeting in Ghana taking in to account it is 
only five years since they adopted inflation targeting formally. 
 
3.5 Monetary vector auto regression (VAR) in developing countries 
In this section, we will see some literatures concerning the effectiveness of monetary 
transmission mechanisms in developing countries. Notably, asset price channel, balance sheet 
channel, bank lending channel, exchange rate channel, expectation channel and interest rate 
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channel. Since now a day’s VAR analysis is preferable to analyze the effectiveness of these 
channels we will see literatures which have used this methodology. 
 
Era Dabla et al (2006) they found that, output will be considerably affected due to shocks to 
domestic monetary aggregates, but this appear to have no significant impact on prices. 
However, they found that inflation in Armenia does respond to changes in broad money (M2), 
once foreign currency deposits are incorporated. Even though, there is some evidence for a 
transmission of shocks to the repo rate to CPI inflation, the interest rate channel remains weak. 
As in many emerging and developing economies with a high level of dollarization, the exchange 
rate channel appears to have a stronger impact on prices. 
 
Therefore, the overall result shows that, the central bank’s means to influence economic 
activity and inflation are extremely limited. For a successful transition, to a full-fledged inflation 
targeting monetary policy framework improving the performance of these channels will be 
leading. At the same time, Leiderman, Maino, and Parrado (2006) found that the way the 
monetary policy responds to an economic change is dependent on the regime. 
 
In the developing countries, unlike the developed countries, the transmission of monetary 
policy is relatively little known about the way money shocks are transmitted to the real sector. 
Carlyn Ramlogan (2004) in his paper to conduct an empirical analysis of monetary transmission 
mechanism in Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and Guyana and found from his VAR analysis in all 
four countries that the credit and exchange rate channels are more influential than the 
monetary channel in transmitting impulses from the financial sector to the real sector. 
 
Buigut (2009) examined monetary transmission mechanism in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. He 
used VAR methodology by incorporating three variables (real output, inflation and interest rate) 
and ordered output first and consequently inflation and interest rate. In his result, he found 




In a similar manner, Lungut (2008) examined monetary transmission mechanism in Botswana, 
Malawi, Namibia, and Zambia. He used VAR methodology by taking in to account seven 
variables (industrial production (IPIX), prices, monetary base, M2, the policy rate, supply of 
loans and lending and deposit rate). In opposite to Buigut ordering, he ordered the policy rate 
first. This is due to, the assumption that monetary policy does not react to any other variables 
in the system. Although he found mixed result, the general pattern was the bank lending and 
deposit respond to the shock in expected direction. However, the shock has little impact on 
prices, output and total bank lending. 
 
Along the same vein, Abradu-Otoo et al (2003) examined monetary transmission mechanism of 
Ghana.  He used the vector error correction model (VECM) and incorporated seven variables 
(growth rate, inflation rate, change in the exchange rate, and credit to private investors, broad 
money, T-bill rate and oil price). However, in their result, they neither come with statistically 
significant effects of monetary policy shock nor consistent with economic theories. In both 
computed impulse, (using the generalized impulse) response function and point estimates. 
 
Using more sophisticated identification strategies, Cheng (2006) examined monetary 
transmission in Kenya. He used VAR methodology with five variables (real output, price level, 
money stock, policy rate, and nominal exchange rate). He essentially used two ordering system, 
the first like what i have put the variables above based on the theory of Peersman and Smets 
(2001); and the second based on Sims and Zha (1998) in which the real GDP did not respond to 
any other variables in the system; price level respond to GDP; the money supply responds to all 
variables except exchange rate; the policy rate responds to exchange rate and stock of money. 
At last, but not the least he assumes that exchange rate responds to all variables. Based on 
both ordering, he found that the interest transmission has considerable impact on the price 
level and exchange rate. However, we do not see similar impact with the real variables. From 
these results, interestingly he concluded that the price level is affected by monetary policy 




In 2009, Ngalawa, examined a VAR model of Malawi using the same variables as what Cheng 
did. However, beside to that he used bank loans and reserve money. In this system GDP do not 
respond to any of the variables in the system, the price level respond only to GDP, exchange 
rate responds to GDP and price level, the broad money responds to GDP, price and bank rate; 
the bank rate responds to exchange rate; the reserve money responds to all variables except 
GDP and price; and the bank loan responds to all variables in the system. Therefore, based on 
his estimation he found out that, the bank rate affects bank lending, GDP, price level in line 
with the theoretical expectation. However, neither of them found to be significant. 
 
Another pertinent literature is Malick (2009) examined the monetary transmission in India. He 
used VAR methodology and applied the recursive ordering in his five variables (GDP, price, 
interest rate, long term interest and exchange rate) based on the theory of Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992). These restrictions need monetary policy contraction to be accompanied by the 
increase in both short and long term interest, decrease in price; however it left out GDP to be 
determined by the figure. Therefore, based on his result he concluded that shocks in the 
demand are of little importance. 
 
Almost all of the above literature support a prior research conducted in this topic. That is in 
countries where the money market is relatively under developed the money market will not be 
the principal conduit of monetary policy shocks. In all these countries, investors face a limited 










CHAPTER FOUR: DATA SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Data and Choice of Variables 
I examine the impact of three policy instruments, interest rate, exchange rate and money 
supply. Unlike in developed countries, short term interest rate is not the main instruments of 
monetary policy. In spite of that I have used t-bill rate as a signal of the monetary policy motive. 
The second policy related variable is the nominal exchange rate. I tried to concentrate on the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), to evaluate the impact of exchange rate changes on 
output and prices. To distinguish the exchange rate channel from other channels I did not use 
real effective exchange rate (REER). The last but not the least, policy related variable is narrow 
money or M1. In general, broad money M2 is also highly correlated with output and prices than 
M1. Therefore, I have used M2 as a good proxy for the monetary policy stance. 
 
In addition to the previous three policy instrument variables, I have used other variables as 
well. That is output and the general price level. These variables are measured by real GDP and 
consumer price index (CPI)11 respectively. Since it is extremely beneficial to have stationary in 
characterizing the relationship between output, price and policy related variables I made my 
data stationery. To control for over all international economic scenario I have included export 
(export), fed rate (fed) and international oil price (oilp).  
 
Regarding the transformation of the data all variables except T-bill rate are in log. This is 
because it will be easy for the interpretation of result and to work with. To make the data 
                                                          
11
 The new CPI base of Ethiopia includes two indexes, the non-food index and the food index. The Food Index has 
13 sub-groups these are: Cereals; Pulses; Bread and Other Prepared Food; Meat; Milk, Cheese and Eggs; 
Vegetables and Fruits; Oil and Fats Spices; Potatoes, Other Tubers and Stems; Coffee Beans (whole) and Tea 
Leaves; Other Food Items; Milling Charges; and Food taken Away from Home. On the other hand, the non food 
index constitutes ten major groups each, namely: Beverages; Cigarettes and Tobacco; Clothing and Footwear; 
House Rent, Construction Materials, Water, and Fuel and Power; Furniture, Furnishing, Household Equipment and 
Operation; Medical Care and Health; Transport and Communication; Recreation, Entertainment and Education; 
Personal Care and Effects; and Miscellaneous Goods and Services. These data are collected from 119 market places 
and with different weight based on the spending of the people. 
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stable /stationery I have differenced all the data once with the exception of exchange rate (EXC) 
which is differenced twice. 
4.2. Methodology  
This section of the paper is devoted to the introduction and detailed explanation of the 
methodology I have used in the paper. In order to achieve my objective I have used the vector 
auto regression (VAR) method. The VAR mode assumes the Ethiopian economy can be 
described using the following equation: 
 
Where g(l) is an n x n matrix polynomial in the lag operator; c(l) is a n x k matrix polynomial in 
the lag operator; Yt is a n x 1 vector of endogenous Ethiopian variables ; and Xt is a K x 1 vector 
of exogenous international variables which are not affected by Ethiopia . This is because 
Ethiopia is a small open economy. At last εt is a n x 1 vector of structural disturbance, with 
variance of Ω. Where, Ω is a diagonal matrix. 
 
Where a(l) and b(l) are matrices polynomial ; μt is a vector of reduced form of the disturbance 
terms , with variance of ∑ . 
If we assume a contemporaneous coefficient matrix in the structural form F and h(l) a 
coefficient matrix in g(l) without contemporaneous coefficient . That is 
 
The above structural and reduced form can be related like the following equation: 
 




Throughout my research I will assume the exogenous vector Xt commodity price index (export), 
which is calculated based on the main export items of Ethiopia, the world oil price index (oilp) 
and the federal funds rate (fed). 
 = ……………………………………………………………………………….. (6) 
The above variables are incorporated to control for changes in the overall international 
economic scenario and the volatility of oil price and Ethiopian export items. The above variables 
are considered exogenous basically by assuming the Ethiopian economy will not have an impact 
in the world economy. 
The endogenous variable includes real gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index 
(CPI), money supply (MS), Treasury bill (TBILL) and exchange rate (EXC). 
  = …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (7) 
The model will take in to account two identification approaches. The first identification scheme 
is the standard approach that imposes a recursive structure of the VAR with the ordering of the 
variables equation (7). This ordering assumes that the consumer price index (CPI) does not have 
an influence on gross domestic product (GDP). Money supply (MS) does not have an immediate 
effect on consumer price index (CPI). In the same manner the T-bill rate does not have an 
immediate effect on the money supply. At last but not the least this model assumes the 
exchange rate does not an immediate effect on the T-bill rate and to the monetary policy. 
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 =   ................................................................ (8) 
The above matrices shows the relationship between the reduced form errors and the structural 
disturbance .The recursive identification is based on the paper of Sims and zha (1998) and 
assumes no contemporaneous between monetary policy , money ,and the exchange rate . 
The other alternative model is based on Kim and roubini (2000) which relaxes the above 
assumptions. 
 =    …………………………………………………………. (9) 
The first two equations represent sluggish response of the real GDP and prices with respect to 
shocks to the nominal variables, money supply, repo rate and the nominal exchange rate. The 
third equation shows the money supply can be affected contemporaneously by shock in output, 
price and T-bill rate. The fourth equation shows that repo rate will not be affected 
contemporaneously by the shock of output and price. However it will be affected 
contemporaneously by money supply and exchange rate.   At last, the last equation, shocks in 
all variables have a contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate.  
In estimating these both VAR and SVAR methods, I have used eveiws7 soft ware package for 
computation. I used this software, because of access and convenient for me. 
I have used a VAR length based on the traditional information criteria (Akaike information 
criteria (AIC) and the Schwartz information criteria), and the residuals were tested for 
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autocorrelation.12 The Schwartz criterion suggests a lag of one order, and the Akaike criteria 
suggest a five lag; I tried to compare using both lags in my result. But because the result with 
five lag was not stable I did not use it in my analysis. Therefore, I have used only one lag based 
on the Schwartz criteria and the result was also stable.13 This is also used in most empirical 
studies with limited data. Although Doing otherwise will give much impressive result , I did not 
because it means analyzing unreliable results and ending up in a wrong conclusion. in addition 
to the above reasons the schwartz criteria is consistent and select the more parsimonious 













                                                          
12
 The test for lag selection and autocorrelation are presented in appendix 2 and 5 respectively. 
13
 the VAR  stability condition check is in appendix 4 
14
 Walter enders , 2010, page 71-72 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  EMPIRICAL RESULT  
 
4.1 Empirical Analysis  
One of the basic requirement, for inflation targeting to be successful, is there must be 
predictable and persistent relationship between the monetary policy instrument and inflation. 
Therefore, in this section i will present my empirical result of vector auto regression (VAR) and 
SVAR. Which have five endogenous variables and three exogenous variables15, from the five 
endogenous variables; three of them are policy instrument variables. In the meantime, I will 
present the granger causality test on some selected channels of monetary transmission as a 
glimpse to the VAR analysis and the result are as follows:  
 
Table 4 VAR granger causality 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 07/18/12   Time: 09:58  
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4  
Included observations: 52  
    
        
Dependent variable: D_L_GDP_NA  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_L_CPI_NA  0.800140 2  0.6703 
D_L_M2_NA  0.291649 2  0.8643 
D_L_TBILL_NA  0.043500 2  0.9785 
D_D_L_EXC_NA  0.078747 2  0.9614 
    
    All  1.036398 8  0.9980 
    
    Dependent variable: D_L_CPI_NA  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_L_GDP_NA  0.785153 2  0.6753 
D_L_M2_NA  16.49233 2  0.0003 
D_L_TBILL_NA  0.382705 2  0.8258 
D_D_L_EXC_NA  6.210478 2  0.0448 
    
    All  19.94792 8  0.0105 
    
     
Sources: own regression using Eveiws7  
                                                          
15
 The trend of all these variables can be seen in appendix 1 
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The above table shows the result of bivariate and multivariate block granger causality test for 
price (CPI) and output (GDP) in Ethiopia. The result from this estimation shows that whether an 
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous for each equation in the VAR. in a nut shell, 
the result suggest the overall significance of the policy variables to price and output. 
 
 Whilst, the joint probability shows the rejection of the null hypothesis for the multivariate 
case; the bivariate test for GDP shows that all the variables are not causing significant variation 
in GDP. This result is a little bit different from the case of other developing countries. In most 
case scenarios, both money supply and exchange rate are significant. However, this result is 
much the same with respect to the interest rate; that is it does not have a significant impact to 
the GDP. This is because the money and financial market is not developed. In addition to that, 
the join probability of the multivariate case was strongly rejected in the case of inflation (CPI). 
The bivariate test shows us, with the exception of the Treasury bill; all the policy instrument 
variables are causing significant variation in CPI. This finding is in line with my expectation and 
previous literatures. 
 
To verify the above result, i have presented results for simple VAR and structural VAR in a 
similar way. Accordingly, first, I have presented the results from the simple VAR and in the next 
part I have presented results from structural VAR. 
4.2 Results from Simple VAR  
Another common way to interpret the relationship between monetary policy instruments and 
CPI or GDP using vector auto regression (VAR) is to estimate impulse response function and 
variance decomposition. Throughout this analysis, I have used a period of 10 quarters ahead in 
the analysis of impulse response function and the variance decompositions and confidence 
interval of 95 percent. This is represented by the dots in the impulse response graph. 
 
 An impulse response function traces the effect of one time shock to one of the innovations on 
current and future movement of the endogenous variable. For example, in my analysis, if there 
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is a predictable and strong relationship between future CPI or future GDP and monetary policy 
instrument, then it can be said that the lagged changes in the monetary policy instruments are 
economically significant in explaining future CPI or GDP. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D_L_CPI_NA to D_D_L_EXC_NA
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Sources: own result from eveiws7 estimation  
 
The above figure, the quarterly impulse response, indicates how the monetary policy and other 
policy instrument variables affect CPI and GDP. Specifically, it shows how either CPI or GDP 
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responds to shocks or innovation in the other endogenous variables. The response of CPI, for 
two standard deviation shock in domestic money supply (M2) results in an increase in the 
consumer price index (CPI) from 0.2 to 1.7 percent following the shock and remains significant 
until the fifth quarter. However, there is a difference in the pace of the movement. From the 
first quarter to the third quarter the persistency is very high and reaches its climax at the third 
quarter which is 1.7 percent. From fourth quarter to the six quarter the persistency decreases 
but remains strong. However, from the seventh quarter afterwards the persistency decreases 
and reaches its minimum level which is 0.2 percent. On the other hand, the response of money 
supply (M2) to innovation in the consumer price index (CPI) is neutral in the medium and long 
term horizons. However, in the short term the money supply respond positively to the inflation 
rate. To sum up, if there is an expansionary monetary policy16 , which works through the 
liquidity channel, it will increase the price level in the economy. In the contrary if there is an 
inflation pressure it is not followed by contractionary monetary measure. The later one can be 
seen in appendix 7. 
 
The response of CPI to positive innovation in GDP17 is, however, Contrary to what intuition or 
common sense would indicate, although they are not strong throughout ranging from 0.1 
percent to 0.3 percent. This shows that increase in the productivity leads to an increase in the 
price level. The other important response of CPI is due to innovation or shocks in exchange rate. 
The response of consumer price index is not very strong both in short term and long term. 
Beside to that there is inconsistency in the result first the CPI increases, later decreases and in 
the long term it returns to what it where.  It only stood from 0.3 percent when it rises and -0.1 
when it falls. This finding was not as to my expectation taking in to account more 50 % of the 
component of CPI are imported commodity. 
 
But this may be also due to the government intervention in those imported commodities. For 
instance, the government subsidizes the price of fuel, edible oil and sugar; which are some of 
the main components of consumer price index (CPI). When we see the importance of this 
                                                          
16
 when the government increases the spending and decreases taxation  
17
 See appendix 7 for the detail  
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transmission mechanism with regard to inflation targeting there are some arguments between 
economists. While some of them argue that flexible exchange rate is consistent18 with inflation 
targeting regime, others, nevertheless, think that it will create instability19.  
 
In the case of GDP, the socks in the policy instrument variables have less significance. 
Particularly shock in M2, do not have medium and long term effects. For instance, two standard 
deviation shocks in money supply affect slightly GDP in the short run by only 0.11 percent. 
Although the result is insignificant, it is in line with the theory that monetary expansion has an 
impact in the short run, but not in the medium and long term.  In a similar manner shocks in t-
bill and exchange rate do not have medium term and long term effect on GDP. May expectation 
here was to have negative relationship between GDP and the Treasury bill rate, through the 
investment channel. 
 
The Variance decomposition results presented in the table below agree with the above 
empirical findings from the impulse responses. The 10 period forecast (2 years and half) show 
that, put together, the variances of output, money supply, exchange rate and interest rate 
account for less that 40 percent of variability in CPI until the second year (4 quarter). In other 
words, shocks or innovations to these endogenous variables explain less than 40 percent 
variation in the level of consumer price index (CPI) in the short and medium term horizons. This 
implies that the price behavior is characterized by apathy nature within these time horizons. 
However, this slightly changes after the sixth quarter when the innovation in GDP and money 





                                                          
18
 Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Savastano (2002) and De Gregorio, Tokman and Valdes (2005). Edward 
(2006) 
19 This connection between inflation targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one 
of the costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. 
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Table 5 Variance decomposition for simple VAR without exogenous variables 
       
        Variance Decomposition 
of D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. 
D_L_GDP_N
A D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA 
       
        1  0.010015  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.011968  98.72310  0.341510  0.681380  0.011354  0.242655 
 3  0.012752  97.83628  0.634476  1.299493  0.010015  0.219738 
 4  0.013068  97.63024  0.695464  1.420969  0.009662  0.243666 
 5  0.013206  97.48948  0.739201  1.522179  0.009468  0.239676 
 6  0.013263  97.45339  0.748842  1.544549  0.009411  0.243809 
 7  0.013288  97.42723  0.756317  1.564013  0.009376  0.243068 
 8  0.013299  97.42025  0.757937  1.568617  0.009365  0.243827 
 9  0.013304  97.41517  0.759238  1.572548  0.009359  0.243687 
 10  0.013306  97.41377  0.759508  1.573537  0.009356  0.243828 
       
        Variance Decomposition 
of D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. 
D_L_GDP_N
A D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA 
       
        1  0.032390  0.199974  99.80003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.038777  0.258595  79.84330  18.86524  0.564824  0.468038 
 3  0.042774  0.622180  67.62428  30.81832  0.493007  0.442214 
 4  0.044779  1.069937  62.84486  35.15984  0.460156  0.465205 
 5  0.046012  1.465488  59.96050  37.68360  0.443496  0.446921 
 6  0.046673  1.783697  58.54621  38.78850  0.433810  0.447785 
 7  0.047078  2.012136  57.65831  39.46038  0.428501  0.440673 
 8  0.047300  2.171204  57.18752  39.77621  0.425328  0.439736 
 9  0.047434  2.275476  56.89622  39.96749  0.423537  0.437276 
 10  0.047508  2.342775  56.73733  40.06072  0.422475  0.436708 
       





D_D_L_EXC_NA       
       
       Sources: Own estimation using Eveiws7 
 
In a nut shell, a policy change in either exchange rate or interest rate is unlikely to bring desired 
change in price as the two accounted for less than 5 percent (jointly) in the short and medium 
term. Nevertheless, the change in the money supply and output has a prominent role in both 
short term and medium term. In the long term, although the trend gradually changes, CPI 
accounts for less than 57 percent of its variance. The contribution of exchange rate and interest 
rate to the variance remains minimal. In the other hand, output and money supply gained more 
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prominence. This further underscores the need for an increase in productivity and importance 
of the monetary transmission channel in checking inflation in the economy. 
 
The variance decomposition of output20 follows suit as it also totally drives its own variance in 
the first quarter. Putting together, the variance decomposition of price level, money supply, 
exchange rate and interest rate account for less that 3 percent of variability in GDP until the 
first second (8 quarter). There is no signee of change even in the long run, the combined effect 
of those variables remains well below 3 percent. When we see the individual effect, we see the 
contribution of money supply, interest rate and exchange rate to be meager. This is basically in 
line with what we found in the both the granger causality and impulse response results.  
 
Therefore, a policy change in either exchange rate or interest rate is less likely to bring the most 
wanted increase in output as the two accounted for less than 1 percent in the short, medium 
and long term. However, the result with regard to money supply shows that a shock or 
innovation in money supply may boost up the output in both short term and medium term but 
still with less than 2 percent. This result again underscores the importance of monetary 
transmission channel. Although this result is in line with my expectation, it has a tendency to 
refute the neutrality of money21 in the long run. 
 
To verify my result from the simple VAR, I slightly changed the model by incorporating the 
exogenous variables and the result was basically the same. Specifically, the results with respect 
to the policy instruments are more or less the same. Although, there is a difference in the 
percentage point, the trend and the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism is the same. 
With respect to the exogenous variables we see that they have short and medium term impact 
on both price and output. However, in the long term they are pretty much neutral.22 
                                                          
20
 Appendix 8 variance decomposition for simple VAR without exogenous variable  
21
 According to this theory money cannot have a long term impact on real variables. However, they can be a 
solution not to be a problem by itself. 
22
 All the result for this model can be seen in the appendix  
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4.3 Results from Structural VAR  
To substantiate, the results I found in the simple VAR, I made an estimation of structural VAR 
and the following result are presented here below. In the analysis I have used both the 
recursive and no recursive ordering of structural VAR. However, because the hessian of the non 
recursive result is nearly singular I will present the result from the recursive ordering only. 
Furthermore, the analysis has the same format like what I have did in the simple VAR. That is, 
first without the exogenous variables and later on with exogenous variables. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D_L_CPI_NA to Shock5
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Sources: own estimation using eveiws7 
 
The above figure, the response to structural one standard division innovation, indicates how 
the monetary policy and other policy instrument variables affect CPI and GDP. Specifically, it 
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shows how either CPI or GDP responds to shocks or innovation in the other endogenous 
variables. The response of CPI, for structural one standard deviation innovation in domestic 
money supply (M2) or shock 3, results in an increase in the consumer price index (CPI) from 0.2 
to 1.7 percent following the innovation and remains significant until the fifth quarter. However, 
there is a difference in the volatility of the movement. From the first quarter to the third 
quarter the persistency is very high and reaches its climax at the third quarter which is 1.7 
percent. From fourth quarter to the six quarter the persistency decreases but remains strong. 
However, from the seventh quarter afterwards the persistency decreases and reaches its 
minimum level which is 0.2 percent.  
 
Despite the effectiveness of the monetary transmission, the other policy instruments are less 
effective, particularly in the medium and long term. Although there is some movement in 
consequence to the fourth and fifth variable shocks. Specifically, if there is a shock4 or in t-bill 
CPI will decrease immediately and reaches -0.3 percent at the second quarter and returns to its 
previous level at the 6 quarter. The result shows us, if interest rate increases there is a 
tendency for the inflation rate to decrease. However, the result is not significant and very far 
from achieving the desired objective. Beside to that this policy measure will not have long 
lasting effect, because the response of CPI becomes neutral in the medium term and long term. 
The impulse response for the structural one standard deviation in shock5 or exchange rate is 
very volatile. In effect CPI increased until the third quarter, decreased in the fourth quarter and 
increased again in the fifth quarter. However, after the fourth quarter the CPI returns to its 
previous level and remains stable.  This finding is far from my expectation, because it is natural 
to see inflation increasing after a monetary devaluation and taking in to account 54 to 57 
percent of CPI component are imported items.23 
The other important response is the response of GDP, to the structural one standard deviation 
innovation in the policy instrument variables. The result is in line what I found in the simple 
VAR. That is with the exception of the shock in money supply, a shock in the other policy 
                                                          
23
 Ethiopian central statistics  authority  2006 base of CPI  
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instrument variables do not have significant impact in the volatility of GDP. Beside to the above 
finding, the recursive structural VAR without exogenous variables, I have also estimated VAR 
with exogenous variables and came up with the same results and the result is presented in the 
appendix part. 
 
Table 6 Variance decomposition for structural VAR 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.010015  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.011968  98.72310  0.341510  0.681380  0.011354  0.242655 
 3  0.012752  97.83628  0.634476  1.299493  0.010015  0.219738 
 4  0.013068  97.63024  0.695464  1.420969  0.009662  0.243666 
 5  0.013206  97.48948  0.739201  1.522179  0.009468  0.239676 
 6  0.013263  97.45339  0.748842  1.544549  0.009411  0.243810 
 7  0.013288  97.42723  0.756317  1.564013  0.009376  0.243068 
 8  0.013299  97.42025  0.757937  1.568617  0.009365  0.243827 
 9  0.013304  97.41517  0.759238  1.572548  0.009359  0.243687 
 10  0.013306  97.41377  0.759508  1.573537  0.009356  0.243828 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.032390  0.199974  99.80003  8.11E-34  4.53E-31  0.000000 
 2  0.038777  0.258595  79.84330  18.86524  0.564824  0.468038 
 3  0.042774  0.622180  67.62428  30.81832  0.493007  0.442214 
 4  0.044779  1.069937  62.84486  35.15984  0.460156  0.465205 
 5  0.046012  1.465488  59.96050  37.68360  0.443496  0.446921 
 6  0.046673  1.783697  58.54621  38.78850  0.433810  0.447785 
 7  0.047078  2.012136  57.65831  39.46038  0.428501  0.440673 
 8  0.047300  2.171204  57.18752  39.77621  0.425328  0.439736 
 9  0.047434  2.275476  56.89622  39.96749  0.423537  0.437276 
 10  0.047508  2.342775  56.73733  40.06072  0.422475  0.436708 
       
       Factorization: 
Structural       
       
       
 
Sources: own estimation using eviews7 
 
The Variance decomposition results presented in the table above agree with the above 
empirical findings from the impulse responses and the simple VAR. in both short term and long 
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term the variance decomposition of GDP is explained by less than 3 Percent by the other policy 
instrument variables putting together. This finding confirms what we found in the simple VAR 
and justifies the neutrality of money in affecting real economic variables. On the other hand, 
the variance decomposition of CPI shows the variability is affected significantly by the variance 
of money supply.  This result is also in line with what I found in the simple VAR and some of the 
findings of my literature review. 
 
Therefore, policy measures in exchange rate and the interest rate will not have the desired 
effect of lowering inflation rate. Rather, it would be advisable to control the supply of money or 
the money in the circulation. In a nut shell, both findings (simple VAR and structural VAR) show 
that beside to the monetary transmission, the interest rate and exchange rate transmission 
mechanisms are less effective in Ethiopia. 
 
The result after including the exogenous variables is also basically the same although there is a 
difference in the percentage point. Specifically, the response of CPI to one standard deviation 
structural shock in money supply will increase the inflation rate by 1.17 percent in the second 
quarter and decrease sharply after the third quarter. While the shock in the other policy 
instrument variables is insignificant for inflation. Likewise, the response of GDP to shocks in 
money supply increases GDP until the third quarter with 0.06 percent. However, after the third 
quarter it remains neutral. On the other hand, the shock in t-bill rate and exchange rate are 





                                                          
24
 The detail estimation is presented in appendix 19 and 20  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
5.1 Conclusion  
In my paper, I have tried to see the applicability of inflation targeting in Ethiopia using quarterly 
data from 1998 Q1 to 2011 Q4. Although I have discussed all the requirements of inflation 
targeting in developing countries in my literature part, I concentrated only on the predictability 
of the transmission mechanism, since this is one of the main requirement in order to adopt 
inflation targeting to any country’s monetary policy.  In order to achieve this objective, i have 
used the simple VAR analysis and structural VAR (in both recursive and non recursive order of 
variables). In the process i tried to analyze the granger causality, impulse response and the 
variance decomposition of the simple VAR and the structural VAR. 
Both the bivariate and multivariate granger causality tests shows that the money supply (M2) 
and the nominal effective exchange rate (EXC) in the economy causes the variation in the level 
of consumer price index (CPI) significantly; However , the treasury bill rate (T-bill) does not 
cause the variation in the price level (CPI). On the other hand, i found that the variation in the 
output level (GDP) is significantly caused by money supply (M2) and consumer price index 
(CPI).However; it was not significantly caused by nominal exchange rate (EXC) and the Treasury 
bill rate (T-bill). 
We can deduce from the impulse response that, the response of consumer price index (CPI) to 
its own shock, although it is les persistent in the long run, in both the short term and medium 
term it is very strong. The response of consumer price index (CPI) to shocks in exchange rate 
(exchange rate channel) and the Treasury bill rate (interest rate channel) are less significant and 
remain the same in both short term and long term. This result is substantiated by the result I 
found in the variance decomposition of consumer price index (CPI). Where the variance of 
consumer price index (CPI) , is explained by exchange rate and t-bill rate by less than 1 percent . 
In the same manner, both policy instrument variables were found to be less effective in driving 
the GDP in the economy. Although it raises doubt, when the policy makers mainly depend on 
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them as a means for achieving effective inflation targeting regime, this does not mean that they 
are totally ineffective in affecting the monetary transmission channels. 
On the other hand, the bond between consumer price index (CPI) and money supply (M2) were 
found to be robust in both the short term and long term. Beside to that, the bond between 
consumer price index and growth in GDP were found to be significant, in both the impulse 
response and variance decomposition .The significance of the money supply transmission 
channel, taking in to account its positive relationship with consumer price index, shows that the 
effect of the money supply shock transfers to the overall economy through the price level. In a 
nut shell, change in GDP and change in the money supply account for more than 40 percent of 
variance in consumer price index (CPI) in the medium term and long term horizon. 
Therefore, based on the result we can conclude that it is very difficult to have predictable and 
significant relationship among the policy instrument variables, GDP and CPI. As I have 
mentioned in the introduction part, the main objective of this paper was to see if there is a 
predictable relationship among the mentioned variables. With the exception of money supply 
there is no predictable and significant relationship. in the case of exchange rate, ironically there 
is a price puzzle and may be due to the inconsistency in the decision of policy makers25 . This 
will make it difficult for the national bank to introduce full-fledged inflation targeting. Because , 
policy measures in  t-bill rate and the exchange rate will not bring the desired objective of 
stabilizing inflation . 
5.2 Recommendation  
Taking in to account the need to have predictable relationship between the policy instrument 
variables ( money supply , interest rate , and exchange rate ) with the consumer price index and  
in view of  the above findings it is not the right time for Ethiopia to adopt  the full fledged 
inflation targeting monetary policy . However, this does not mean that any type of inflation 
                                                          
25
 The government intervenes in the market trough price ceiling in 2010 and abandons it in 2011. The government 
subsidizes fuel, oil, sugar, wheat and cement starting from 2010 and stopped. These policies inconsistency have a 
great role in the price puzzle.  
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targeting cannot be effective in Ethiopia. Rather, Ethiopia can apply inflation targeting 
implicitly26.  
Nevertheless, in order to apply the implicit inflation targeting or limited version of inflation 
targeting, further research in this topic is required. For instance, it would be good to see the 
effectiveness of the expectation channel, the credit channel and the treat of fiscal dominance. 
In addition to the above, it would be advisable for the national bank to decrease its intervention 
in the exchange rate determination by making it driven by market (although in theory it is 
market driven). Furthermore, the government should decrease the subsidies which distort the 













                                                          
26
 Implicit inflation targeting can be defined as a period under which inflation targets are announced to the public, 
but not the regime and its details as such. It involves country acting as if inflation targeting were in place without a 
formal adoption of the regime. Typically, the central bank would also have other intermediate targets, as Turkey 
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Case 1: Estimation of simple VAR with Endogenous Variables and constant  
 
APPENDIX 2 VAR lag selection criteria 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA 
D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA   
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 12:48     
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4     
Included observations: 49     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  389.5529 NA   1.05e-13 -15.69604 -15.50299 -15.62280 
1  448.9762  104.2940   2.59e-14* -17.10107  -15.94281*  -16.66163* 
2  466.0516  26.48420  3.70e-14 -16.77761 -14.65414 -15.97197 
3  485.8484  26.66507  4.98e-14 -16.56524 -13.47655 -15.39340 
4  530.7751   51.34479*  2.62e-14 -17.37857 -13.32467 -15.84053 
5  559.6272  27.08571  3.05e-14  -17.53580* -12.51669 -15.63156 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    




APPENDIX 3 Vector Autoregression estimates 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 07/17/12   Time: 09:41    
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q4 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 53 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      










      
      D_L_GDP_NA(-1)  0.618910 -0.294345  0.110374 -2.124754 -0.147311 
  (0.11716)  (0.37890)  (0.16045)  (7.40815)  (0.46546) 
 [ 5.28276] [-0.77683] [ 0.68791] [-0.28681] [-0.31649] 
      
D_L_CPI_NA(-1) -0.025974  0.329536  0.046995  2.764885 -0.244896 
  (0.03638)  (0.11765)  (0.04982)  (2.30014)  (0.14452) 
 [-0.71405] [ 2.80110] [ 0.94333] [ 1.20205] [-1.69455] 
      
iv 
 
D_L_M2_NA(-1)  0.086430  1.311468  0.602235 -2.070378  0.383624 
  (0.09876)  (0.31939)  (0.13525)  (6.24460)  (0.39235) 
 [ 0.87519] [ 4.10613] [ 4.45279] [-0.33155] [ 0.97775] 
      
D_L_TBILL_NA(-1) -0.000301 -0.005082 -0.000220 -0.139242  0.002595 
  (0.00226)  (0.00729)  (0.00309)  (0.14260)  (0.00896) 
 [-0.13361] [-0.69676] [-0.07110] [-0.97643] [ 0.28967] 
      
D_D_L_EXC_NA(-1)  0.015543  0.069940  0.002485  0.268481 -0.678051 
  (0.02610)  (0.08442)  (0.03575)  (1.65049)  (0.10370) 
 [ 0.59548] [ 0.82850] [ 0.06951] [ 0.16267] [-6.53846] 
      
C  0.004860 -0.027605  0.012924  0.019703 -0.005968 
  (0.00370)  (0.01197)  (0.00507)  (0.23401)  (0.01470) 
 [ 1.31321] [-2.30635] [ 2.54988] [ 0.08420] [-0.40591] 
      
       R-squared  0.434577  0.502503  0.456626  0.049626  0.502245 
 Adj. R-squared  0.374426  0.449578  0.398820 -0.051478  0.449292 
 Sum sq. resids  0.004714  0.049308  0.008842  18.84865  0.074409 
 S.E. equation  0.010015  0.032390  0.013716  0.633273  0.039789 
 F-statistic  7.224734  9.494595  7.899305  0.490838  9.484798 
 Log likelihood  171.9750  109.7650  155.3082 -47.80669  98.86062 
 Akaike AIC -6.263207 -3.915661 -5.634270  2.030441 -3.504174 
 Schwarz SC -6.040155 -3.692609 -5.411218  2.253493 -3.281122 
 Mean dependent  0.019387  0.027150  0.039904 -0.024507 -0.000299 
 S.D. dependent  0.012662  0.043658  0.017690  0.617577  0.053617 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)  1.05E-14    
 Determinant resid covariance  5.78E-15    
 Log likelihood  492.7741    
 Akaike information criterion -17.46318    
 Schwarz criterion -16.34792    
      
 
 
      
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 09:47    
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4    
Included observations: 53    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  9.407328 NA*  9.588239 NA* NA* 
2  30.11404  0.2200  31.10698  0.1855 25 
3  53.31540  0.3480  55.70041  0.2690 50 
4  74.33892  0.4999  78.44014  0.3703 75 
5  91.98153  0.7038  97.92053  0.5402 100 
6  125.7602  0.4641  136.0114  0.2361 125 
7  146.5444  0.5645  159.9583  0.2739 150 
8  183.4680  0.3152  203.4462  0.0694 175 
9  203.3654  0.4205  227.4136  0.0892 200 
10  238.6195  0.2544  270.8662  0.0196 225 
11  263.2748  0.2699  301.9788  0.0136 250 
12  282.5394  0.3643  326.8819  0.0172 275 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
      
 
 





















APPENDIX 4 VAR Stability Condition check 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA 
D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 09:53 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.744054  0.744054 
-0.656254  0.656254 
 0.654794  0.654794 
-0.095638  0.095638 
 0.086431  0.086431 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 




APPENDIX 5 Portmanteau test of autocorrelations 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 09:47    
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4    
Included observations: 53    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  9.407328 NA*  9.588239 NA* NA* 
2  30.11404  0.2200  31.10698  0.1855 25 
3  53.31540  0.3480  55.70041  0.2690 50 
4  74.33892  0.4999  78.44014  0.3703 75 
5  91.98153  0.7038  97.92053  0.5402 100 
6  125.7602  0.4641  136.0114  0.2361 125 
7  146.5444  0.5645  159.9583  0.2739 150 
8  183.4680  0.3152  203.4462  0.0694 175 
9  203.3654  0.4205  227.4136  0.0892 200 
10  238.6195  0.2544  270.8662  0.0196 225 
11  263.2748  0.2699  301.9788  0.0136 250 
12  282.5394  0.3643  326.8819  0.0172 275 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 





APPENDIX 6 Serial Correlation LM tests 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 10:00 
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4 
Included observations: 53 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  24.50335  0.4905 
2  28.96698  0.2653 
3  26.27434  0.3931 
4  22.43810  0.6103 
5  31.11786  0.1851 
6  39.96787  0.0294 
7  25.68202  0.4247 
8  47.30703  0.0045 
9  22.97891  0.5788 
10  49.63474  0.0024 
11  35.26935  0.0834 
12  24.97558  0.4637 
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APPENDIX 8  Variance Decomposition 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.010015  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.011968  98.72310  0.341510  0.681380  0.011354  0.242655 
 3  0.012752  97.83628  0.634476  1.299493  0.010015  0.219738 
 4  0.013068  97.63024  0.695464  1.420969  0.009662  0.243666 
 5  0.013206  97.48948  0.739201  1.522179  0.009468  0.239676 
 6  0.013263  97.45339  0.748842  1.544549  0.009411  0.243809 
 7  0.013288  97.42723  0.756317  1.564013  0.009376  0.243068 
 8  0.013299  97.42025  0.757937  1.568617  0.009365  0.243827 
 9  0.013304  97.41517  0.759238  1.572548  0.009359  0.243687 
 10  0.013306  97.41377  0.759508  1.573537  0.009356  0.243828 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.032390  0.199974  99.80003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.038777  0.258595  79.84330  18.86524  0.564824  0.468038 
 3  0.042774  0.622180  67.62428  30.81832  0.493007  0.442214 
 4  0.044779  1.069937  62.84486  35.15984  0.460156  0.465205 
 5  0.046012  1.465488  59.96050  37.68360  0.443496  0.446921 
 6  0.046673  1.783697  58.54621  38.78850  0.433810  0.447785 
 7  0.047078  2.012136  57.65831  39.46038  0.428501  0.440673 
 8  0.047300  2.171204  57.18752  39.77621  0.425328  0.439736 
 9  0.047434  2.275476  56.89622  39.96749  0.423537  0.437276 
 10  0.047508  2.342775  56.73733  40.06072  0.422475  0.436708 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_M2_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.013716  5.390795  0.645921  93.96328  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.016316  7.362339  2.266784  90.36138  0.006160  0.003336 
 3  0.017591  8.568698  2.979117  88.41900  0.019801  0.013383 
 4  0.018293  9.341785  3.248410  87.36894  0.025979  0.014887 
 5  0.018686  9.847440  3.368228  86.73796  0.028857  0.017512 
 6  0.018909  10.17129  3.418052  86.36217  0.030376  0.018116 
 7  0.019036  10.37695  3.441476  86.13154  0.031132  0.018910 
 8  0.019108  10.50452  3.451303  85.99348  0.031547  0.019150 
 9  0.019149  10.58279  3.455920  85.91013  0.031761  0.019399 
 10  0.019172  10.62994  3.457781  85.86091  0.031880  0.019489 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_TBILL_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.633273  1.206052  0.105760  0.309588  98.37860  0.000000 
ix 
 
 2  0.647008  1.425186  2.067940  0.452985  96.02912  0.024773 
 3  0.648269  1.452160  2.121397  0.740248  95.66011  0.026089 
 4  0.648905  1.455680  2.161000  0.883045  95.47343  0.026841 
 5  0.649287  1.454193  2.175706  0.981726  95.36139  0.026980 
 6  0.649492  1.453586  2.184310  1.033600  95.30134  0.027162 
 7  0.649617  1.454028  2.187898  1.066354  95.26455  0.027167 
 8  0.649688  1.455006  2.189964  1.083816  95.24400  0.027214 
 9  0.649731  1.456019  2.190845  1.094477  95.23145  0.027211 
 10  0.649755  1.456880  2.191347  1.100214  95.22433  0.027224 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_D_L_EXC_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.039789  0.002676  0.409369  7.716800  0.996497  90.87466 
 2  0.049883  0.005043  3.722121  11.19266  0.679422  84.40076 
 3  0.053717  0.004357  3.892644  12.94668  0.634135  82.52219 
 4  0.055163  0.007546  4.131173  12.98747  0.617051  82.25676 
 5  0.055843  0.008020  4.146495  13.29920  0.610523  81.93576 
 6  0.056101  0.009971  4.190119  13.28745  0.607702  81.90476 
 7  0.056229  0.010601  4.191056  13.35434  0.606527  81.83748 
 8  0.056276  0.011511  4.199838  13.34867  0.606007  81.83397 
 9  0.056300  0.011880  4.199614  13.36379  0.605784  81.81894 
 10  0.056309  0.012248  4.201431  13.36200  0.605685  81.81864 
       
        Cholesky Ordering: 
D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA 
D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_NA       
       
       
 
Case 2: Estimation of Simple VAR with Endogenous and Exogenous variables. 
 
APPENDIX 9 Lag length selection criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_NA   
Exogenous variables: C D_L_EXPORT_NA D_L_FED_NA D_L_OILP_NA    
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 12:44     
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4     
Included observations: 49     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  402.3200 NA   1.15e-13 -15.60490 -14.83272 -15.31194 
1  468.5269  108.0930  2.18e-14 -17.28681  -15.54943*  -16.62765* 
2  486.3143  25.41048  3.11e-14 -16.99242 -14.28982 -15.96706 
3  511.4561  30.78593  3.53e-14 -16.99821 -13.33039 -15.60664 
4  561.2133   50.77268*   1.65e-14* -18.00871 -13.37568 -16.25094 
5  593.4613  26.32486  1.88e-14  -18.30454* -12.70630 -16.18058 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
x 
 
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
 
APPENDIX 10 VAR estimates including exogenous variables 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 07/17/12   Time: 12:52    
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q4 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 53 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      





      
      D_L_GDP_NA(-1)  0.625836 -0.274854  0.086606 -1.738581 -0.167173 
  (0.12196)  (0.34249)  (0.14086)  (7.80802)  (0.49024) 
 [ 5.13167] [-0.80251] [ 0.61484] [-0.22267] [-0.34100] 
      
D_L_CPI_NA(-1) -0.032447  0.429687  0.035649  3.101664 -0.253861 
  (0.03961)  (0.11124)  (0.04575)  (2.53596)  (0.15922) 
 [-0.81916] [ 3.86279] [ 0.77922] [ 1.22307] [-1.59437] 
      
D_L_M2_NA(-1)  0.061086  1.025876  0.503385 -1.959955  0.471914 
  (0.10886)  (0.30572)  (0.12574)  (6.96980)  (0.43761) 
 [ 0.56112] [ 3.35555] [ 4.00343] [-0.28121] [ 1.07839] 
      
D_L_TBILL_NA(-1) -0.000491 -0.000713 -0.000165 -0.129893  0.002110 
  (0.00235)  (0.00659)  (0.00271)  (0.15032)  (0.00944) 
 [-0.20923] [-0.10816] [-0.06082] [-0.86410] [ 0.22355] 
      
D_D_L_EXC_NA(-1)  0.012875  0.007232 -0.032074  0.465229 -0.665800 
  (0.02766)  (0.07768)  (0.03195)  (1.77102)  (0.11120) 
 [ 0.46543] [ 0.09310] [-1.00388] [ 0.26269] [-5.98760] 
      
C  0.004814 -0.026788  0.012501  0.026249 -0.006100 
  (0.00377)  (0.01060)  (0.00436)  (0.24157)  (0.01517) 
 [ 1.27588] [-2.52811] [ 2.86846] [ 0.10866] [-0.40218] 
      
D_L_EXPORT_NA  0.036838  0.094064  0.159810 -1.206493 -0.064064 
  (0.03391)  (0.09522)  (0.03916)  (2.17075)  (0.13629) 
 [ 1.08649] [ 0.98788] [ 4.08081] [-0.55580] [-0.47005] 
      
D_L_FED_NA -0.007495 -0.032146  0.002403 -0.184119  0.020393 
  (0.01832)  (0.05146)  (0.02116)  (1.17319)  (0.07366) 
 [-0.40904] [-0.62466] [ 0.11351] [-0.15694] [ 0.27685] 
      
D_L_OILP_NA -0.001687  0.103130  0.016231  0.078161 -0.014556 
  (0.00977)  (0.02744)  (0.01129)  (0.62555)  (0.03928) 
xi 
 
 [-0.17268] [ 3.75852] [ 1.43823] [ 0.12495] [-0.37061] 
      
       R-squared  0.452606  0.636847  0.625842  0.056778  0.506689 
 Adj. R-squared  0.353080  0.570820  0.557813 -0.114716  0.416996 
 Sum sq. resids  0.004564  0.035993  0.006088  18.70678  0.073745 
 S.E. equation  0.010184  0.028601  0.011763  0.652038  0.040939 
 F-statistic  4.547607  9.645149  9.199670  0.331079  5.649160 
 Log likelihood  172.8337  118.1063  165.1958 -47.60649  99.09829 
 Akaike AIC -6.182404 -4.117220 -5.894183  2.136094 -3.399935 
 Schwarz SC -5.847826 -3.782642 -5.559605  2.470672 -3.065357 
 Mean dependent  0.019387  0.027150  0.039904 -0.024507 -0.000299 
 S.D. dependent  0.012662  0.043658  0.017690  0.617577  0.053617 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  7.03E-15    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.77E-15    
 Log likelihood  512.2243    
 Akaike information criterion -17.63110    
 Schwarz criterion -15.95822    
      
       
 
APPENDIX 11 Stability condition check 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA 
D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA  
Exogenous variables: C D_L_EXPORT_NA D_L_FED_NA 
D_L_OILP_NA  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 13:02 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.668144 - 0.045726i  0.669706 
 0.668144 + 0.045726i  0.669706 
-0.640698  0.640698 
 0.194491  0.194491 
-0.126864  0.126864 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 




APPENDIX 12 VAR residual portmanteau test 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 13:05    
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4    
Included observations: 53    
      
      
xii 
 
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  12.11925 NA*  12.35231 NA* NA* 
2  32.78037  0.1367  33.82368  0.1117 25 
3  50.81428  0.4413  52.93961  0.3614 50 
4  72.53761  0.5591  76.43628  0.4321 75 
5  92.07591  0.7014  98.00982  0.5376 100 
6  117.1264  0.6795  126.2583  0.4517 125 
7  138.3332  0.7432  150.6922  0.4688 150 
8  159.0105  0.8013  175.0454  0.4848 175 
9  179.6018  0.8469  199.8486  0.4897 200 
10  211.6680  0.7290  239.3720  0.2436 225 
11  228.2874  0.8341  260.3442  0.3135 250 
12  247.3718  0.8832  285.0142  0.3263 275 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
      
 
 
APPENDIX 13 VAR residual serial correlation tests 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 07/17/12   Time: 13:08 
Sample: 1998Q1 2011Q4 
Included observations: 53 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  30.00291  0.2242 
2  32.45769  0.1452 
3  19.84058  0.7551 
4  26.49439  0.3816 
5  27.37382  0.3375 
6  33.72851  0.1138 
7  26.05946  0.4044 
8  29.76807  0.2331 
9  28.69702  0.2768 
10  47.63699  0.0041 
11  26.33012  0.3902 
12  29.56833  0.2409 
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APPENDIX 15 Variance Decomposition for case 2 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_N
A 
       
        1  0.010184  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.012110  98.94814  0.614080  0.219370  0.046424  0.171981 
 3  0.012863  98.11301  1.313855  0.359005  0.053758  0.160370 
 4  0.013166  97.83331  1.589673  0.343131  0.054915  0.178966 
 5  0.013295  97.65158  1.778977  0.337927  0.055598  0.175916 
 6  0.013350  97.55147  1.855954  0.356449  0.055560  0.180570 
 7  0.013373  97.48941  1.904004  0.371080  0.055569  0.179935 
 8  0.013384  97.45027  1.923851  0.389235  0.055522  0.181118 
 9  0.013388  97.42813  1.935398  0.399956  0.055504  0.181017 
 10  0.013390  97.41465  1.940169  0.408390  0.055488  0.181304 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_N
A 
       
        1  0.028601  0.243272  99.75673  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.032707  0.187476  87.08396  12.70390  0.017223  0.007440 
 3  0.034948  0.179100  78.18169  21.42475  0.023464  0.190995 
 4  0.035955  0.211450  74.61769  24.96126  0.025245  0.184354 
 5  0.036466  0.253480  72.77758  26.72480  0.026814  0.217328 
 6  0.036689  0.293707  72.01287  27.45016  0.027344  0.215926 
 7  0.036800  0.323105  71.61820  27.80921  0.027760  0.221720 
 8  0.036848  0.343325  71.44932  27.95801  0.027914  0.221425 
 9  0.036872  0.355717  71.36368  28.03015  0.028019  0.222434 
 10  0.036882  0.363137  71.32671  28.05972  0.028060  0.222370 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_M2_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_N
A 
       
        1  0.011763  3.868339  1.703162  94.42850  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.013471  5.321160  1.303761  92.47867  0.033853  0.862560 
 3  0.013949  6.348701  1.462464  91.31467  0.036598  0.837567 
 4  0.014196  6.829901  1.444364  90.76878  0.040735  0.916218 
 5  0.014285  7.116396  1.471210  90.45984  0.041425  0.911125 
 6  0.014333  7.252232  1.465379  90.31769  0.042245  0.922451 
 7  0.014350  7.327849  1.467331  90.24113  0.042404  0.921289 
 8  0.014360  7.363484  1.465712  90.20529  0.042569  0.922949 
 9  0.014363  7.382258  1.465557  90.18687  0.042604  0.922708 
 10  0.014365  7.390984  1.465202  90.17824  0.042636  0.922940 
       









 Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_TBILL_NA: 
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_N
A 
       
        1  0.652038  1.552999  0.103293  0.028038  98.31567  0.000000 
 2  0.665575  1.671121  2.203560  0.178515  95.87246  0.074340 
 3  0.666858  1.695209  2.260478  0.413481  95.52447  0.106357 
 4  0.667387  1.704749  2.312614  0.498759  95.37350  0.110375 
 5  0.667728  1.706475  2.319880  0.580351  95.27595  0.117346 
 6  0.667852  1.706463  2.327540  0.607608  95.24057  0.117824 
 7  0.667930  1.706161  2.328811  0.627453  95.21847  0.119109 
 8  0.667958  1.706016  2.330173  0.634256  95.21039  0.119170 
 9  0.667975  1.705940  2.330394  0.638764  95.20550  0.119402 
 10  0.667982  1.705936  2.330630  0.640350  95.20368  0.119409 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_D_L_EXC_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EXC_N
A 
       
        1  0.040939  0.004739  1.356851  6.699564  1.156663  90.78218 
 2  0.051319  0.039858  5.622636  10.12658  0.829356  83.38156 
 3  0.054849  0.042178  5.798013  11.26999  0.753350  82.13647 
 4  0.056170  0.044401  6.059110  11.32620  0.727049  81.84324 
 5  0.056751  0.044186  6.087968  11.52385  0.716304  81.62769 
 6  0.056965  0.044956  6.127483  11.52439  0.712300  81.59087 
 7  0.057063  0.044832  6.131971  11.55965  0.710545  81.55301 
 8  0.057099  0.045074  6.138580  11.55894  0.709881  81.54752 
 9  0.057115  0.045048  6.139303  11.56528  0.709586  81.54079 
 10  0.057121  0.045116  6.140414  11.56505  0.709474  81.53995 
       
        Cholesky Ordering: D_L_GDP_NA 
D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA 
D_L_TBILL_NA D_D_L_EXC_NA       
       
       
 
Case 3: Estimation of Structural VAR with (gdp, cpi, m2, tbill and exc) 
Case 3.1: recursive ordering  
 
 Structural VAR Estimates    
 Date: 07/17/12   Time: 13:55    
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q4 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 53 after adjustments   
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analytic derivatives)  
 Convergence achieved after 10 iterations   
 Structural VAR is just-identified    
      
      Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I    
Restriction Type: short-run text form   
@e1 = C(1)*@u1                
@e2 = C(2)*@e1 + C(3)*@u2              
@e3 = C(4)*@e1 + C(5)*@e2 + C(6)*@u3           
@e4 = C(7)*@e1 + C(8)*@e2 + C(9)*@e3+ c(10)*@u4         




where     
@e1 represents D_L_GDP_NA residuals   
@e2 represents D_L_CPI_NA residuals   
@e3 represents D_L_M2_NA residuals    
@e4 represents D_L_TBILL_NA residuals   
@e5 represents D_D_L_EXC_NA residuals   
      
       Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C(2)  0.144627  0.443803  0.325882  0.7445  
C(4)  0.313052  0.182536  1.715018  0.0863  
C(5)  0.034067  0.056440  0.603599  0.5461  
C(7)  7.865969  8.859684  0.887839  0.3746  
C(8) -0.546182  2.675558 -0.204137  0.8382  
C(9) -2.650232  6.489395 -0.408394  0.6830  
C(11)  0.178583  0.538975  0.331339  0.7404  
C(12)  0.110452  0.161633  0.683351  0.4944  
C(13) -0.814591  0.392492 -2.075433  0.0379  
C(14)  0.006324  0.008295  0.762350  0.4459  
C(1)  0.010015  0.000973  10.29563  0.0000  
C(3)  0.032358  0.003143  10.29563  0.0000  
C(6)  0.013295  0.001291  10.29563  0.0000  
C(10)  0.628118  0.061008  10.29563  0.0000  
C(15)  0.037930  0.003684  10.29563  0.0000  
      
      Log likelihood   476.8550     
      
      Estimated A matrix:    
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.144627  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.313052 -0.034067  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-7.865969  0.546182  2.650232  1.000000  0.000000  
-0.178583 -0.110452  0.814591 -0.006324  1.000000  
Estimated B matrix:    
 0.010015  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.032358  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.013295  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.628118  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.037930  
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APPENDIX 17 Variance decomposition for case 3.1 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.010015  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.011968  98.72310  0.341510  0.681380  0.011354  0.242655 
 3  0.012752  97.83628  0.634476  1.299493  0.010015  0.219738 
 4  0.013068  97.63024  0.695464  1.420969  0.009662  0.243666 
 5  0.013206  97.48948  0.739201  1.522179  0.009468  0.239676 
 6  0.013263  97.45339  0.748842  1.544549  0.009411  0.243809 
 7  0.013288  97.42723  0.756317  1.564013  0.009376  0.243068 
 8  0.013299  97.42025  0.757937  1.568617  0.009365  0.243827 
 9  0.013304  97.41517  0.759238  1.572548  0.009359  0.243687 
 10  0.013306  97.41377  0.759508  1.573537  0.009356  0.243828 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.032390  0.199974  99.80003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.038777  0.258595  79.84330  18.86524  0.564824  0.468038 
 3  0.042774  0.622180  67.62428  30.81832  0.493007  0.442214 
 4  0.044779  1.069937  62.84486  35.15984  0.460156  0.465205 
 5  0.046012  1.465488  59.96050  37.68360  0.443496  0.446921 
 6  0.046673  1.783697  58.54621  38.78850  0.433810  0.447785 
 7  0.047078  2.012136  57.65831  39.46038  0.428501  0.440673 
 8  0.047300  2.171204  57.18752  39.77621  0.425328  0.439736 
 9  0.047434  2.275476  56.89622  39.96749  0.423537  0.437276 
 10  0.047508  2.342775  56.73733  40.06072  0.422475  0.436708 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_M2_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.013716  5.390795  0.645921  93.96328  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.016316  7.362339  2.266784  90.36138  0.006160  0.003336 
 3  0.017591  8.568698  2.979117  88.41900  0.019801  0.013383 
 4  0.018293  9.341785  3.248410  87.36894  0.025979  0.014887 
 5  0.018686  9.847440  3.368228  86.73796  0.028857  0.017512 
 6  0.018909  10.17129  3.418052  86.36217  0.030376  0.018116 
 7  0.019036  10.37695  3.441476  86.13154  0.031132  0.018910 
 8  0.019108  10.50452  3.451303  85.99348  0.031547  0.019150 
 9  0.019149  10.58279  3.455920  85.91013  0.031761  0.019399 
 10  0.019172  10.62994  3.457781  85.86091  0.031880  0.019489 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_L_TBILL_NA:       
 Period S.E. D_L_GDP_NA D_L_CPI_NA D_L_M2_NA D_L_TBILL_NA 
D_D_L_EX
C_NA 
       
        1  0.633273  1.206052  0.105760  0.309588  98.37860  0.000000 
 2  0.647008  1.425186  2.067940  0.452985  96.02912  0.024773 
 3  0.648269  1.452160  2.121397  0.740248  95.66011  0.026089 
 4  0.648905  1.455680  2.161000  0.883045  95.47343  0.026841 
 5  0.649287  1.454193  2.175706  0.981726  95.36139  0.026980 
xix 
 
 6  0.649492  1.453586  2.184310  1.033600  95.30134  0.027162 
 7  0.649617  1.454028  2.187898  1.066354  95.26455  0.027167 
 8  0.649688  1.455006  2.189964  1.083816  95.24400  0.027214 
 9  0.649731  1.456019  2.190845  1.094477  95.23145  0.027211 
 10  0.649755  1.456880  2.191347  1.100214  95.22433  0.027224 
       
        Variance Decomposition of 
D_D_L_EXC_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.039789  0.002676  0.409369  7.716800  0.996497  90.87466 
 2  0.049883  0.005043  3.722121  11.19266  0.679422  84.40076 
 3  0.053717  0.004357  3.892644  12.94668  0.634135  82.52219 
 4  0.055163  0.007546  4.131173  12.98747  0.617051  82.25676 
 5  0.055843  0.008020  4.146495  13.29920  0.610523  81.93576 
 6  0.056101  0.009971  4.190119  13.28745  0.607702  81.90476 
 7  0.056229  0.010601  4.191056  13.35434  0.606527  81.83748 
 8  0.056276  0.011511  4.199838  13.34867  0.606007  81.83397 
 9  0.056300  0.011880  4.199614  13.36379  0.605784  81.81894 
 10  0.056309  0.012248  4.201431  13.36200  0.605685  81.81864 
       
        Factorization :Structural        
       
       
 
 
Case 3.2: non recursive ordering method  
 
The hessian is near singular; therefore I could not have the result. 
 
 
Case 4: Estimation of SVAR with (gdp,cpi,m2,tbill,exc, export, fed and oilp) 
Case 4.1 Recursive ordering  
APPENDIX 18  STRUCTURAL VAR Estimation 
 Structural VAR Estimates    
 Date: 07/17/12   Time: 12:52    
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q4 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 53 after adjustments   
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analytic derivatives)  
 Convergence achieved after 10 iterations   
 Structural VAR is just-identified    
      
      Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I    
Restriction Type: short-run text form   
@e1 = C(1)*@u1                
@e2 = C(2)*@e1 + C(3)*@u2              
@e3 = C(4)*@e1 + C(5)*@e2 + C(6)*@u3           
@e4 = C(7)*@e1 + C(8)*@e2 + C(9)*@e3+ c(10)*@u4         








@e1 represents D_L_GDP_NA residuals   
@e2 represents D_L_CPI_NA residuals   
@e3 represents D_L_M2_NA residuals    
@e4 represents D_L_TBILL_NA residuals   
@e5 represents D_D_L_EXC_NA residuals   
      
       Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C(2)  0.138514  0.385285  0.359511  0.7192  
C(4)  0.234613  0.154358  1.519925  0.1285  
C(5) -0.053740  0.054964 -0.977720  0.3282  
C(7)  8.304265  8.918788  0.931098  0.3518  
C(8) -0.784923  3.136706 -0.250238  0.8024  
C(9) -0.955157  7.769165 -0.122942  0.9022  
C(11)  0.165486  0.542481  0.305055  0.7603  
C(12)  0.122464  0.189359  0.646730  0.5178  
C(13) -0.920519  0.468804 -1.963545  0.0496  
C(14)  0.006810  0.008287  0.821752  0.4112  
C(1)  0.010184  0.000989  10.29563  0.0000  
C(3)  0.028566  0.002775  10.29563  0.0000  
C(6)  0.011431  0.001110  10.29563  0.0000  
C(10)  0.646524  0.062796  10.29563  0.0000  
C(15)  0.039007  0.003789  10.29563  0.0000  
      
      Log likelihood   487.5657     
      
      Estimated A matrix:    
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.138514  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.234613  0.053740  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-8.304265  0.784923  0.955157  1.000000  0.000000  
-0.165486 -0.122464  0.920519 -0.006810  1.000000  
Estimated B matrix:    
 0.010184  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.028566  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.011431  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.646524  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.039007  
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APPENDIX 20 Variance decomposition for the recursive structural VAR 
 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_L_GDP_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.010184  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.012110  98.94814  0.614080  0.219370  0.046424  0.171981 
 3  0.012863  98.11301  1.313855  0.359005  0.053758  0.160370 
 4  0.013166  97.83331  1.589673  0.343131  0.054915  0.178966 
 5  0.013295  97.65158  1.778977  0.337927  0.055598  0.175916 
 6  0.013350  97.55147  1.855954  0.356449  0.055560  0.180570 
 7  0.013373  97.48941  1.904004  0.371080  0.055569  0.179935 
 8  0.013384  97.45027  1.923851  0.389235  0.055522  0.181118 
 9  0.013388  97.42813  1.935398  0.399956  0.055504  0.181017 
 10  0.013390  97.41465  1.940169  0.408390  0.055488  0.181304 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_L_CPI_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.028601  0.243272  99.75673  7.69E-34  6.15E-31  0.000000 
 2  0.032707  0.187476  87.08396  12.70390  0.017223  0.007440 
 3  0.034948  0.179100  78.18169  21.42475  0.023464  0.190995 
 4  0.035955  0.211450  74.61769  24.96126  0.025245  0.184354 
 5  0.036466  0.253480  72.77758  26.72480  0.026814  0.217328 
 6  0.036689  0.293707  72.01287  27.45016  0.027344  0.215926 
 7  0.036800  0.323105  71.61820  27.80921  0.027760  0.221720 
 8  0.036848  0.343325  71.44932  27.95801  0.027914  0.221425 
 9  0.036872  0.355717  71.36368  28.03015  0.028019  0.222434 
 10  0.036882  0.363137  71.32671  28.05972  0.028060  0.222370 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_L_M2_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.011763  3.868339  1.703162  94.42850  3.64E-30  0.000000 
 2  0.013471  5.321160  1.303761  92.47867  0.033853  0.862560 
 3  0.013949  6.348701  1.462464  91.31467  0.036598  0.837567 
 4  0.014196  6.829901  1.444364  90.76878  0.040735  0.916218 
 5  0.014285  7.116396  1.471210  90.45984  0.041425  0.911125 
 6  0.014333  7.252232  1.465379  90.31769  0.042245  0.922451 
 7  0.014350  7.327849  1.467331  90.24113  0.042404  0.921289 
 8  0.014360  7.363484  1.465712  90.20529  0.042569  0.922949 
 9  0.014363  7.382258  1.465557  90.18687  0.042604  0.922708 
 10  0.014365  7.390984  1.465202  90.17824  0.042636  0.922940 
       











 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.652038  1.552999  0.103293  0.028038  98.31567  0.000000 
 2  0.665575  1.671121  2.203560  0.178515  95.87246  0.074340 
 3  0.666858  1.695209  2.260478  0.413481  95.52447  0.106357 
 4  0.667387  1.704749  2.312614  0.498759  95.37350  0.110375 
 5  0.667728  1.706475  2.319880  0.580351  95.27595  0.117346 
 6  0.667852  1.706463  2.327540  0.607608  95.24057  0.117824 
 7  0.667930  1.706161  2.328811  0.627453  95.21847  0.119109 
 8  0.667958  1.706016  2.330173  0.634256  95.21039  0.119170 
 9  0.667975  1.705940  2.330394  0.638764  95.20550  0.119402 
 10  0.667982  1.705936  2.330630  0.640350  95.20368  0.119409 
       
        Variance 
Decomposition of 
D_D_L_EXC_NA:       
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.040939  0.004739  1.356851  6.699564  1.156663  90.78218 
 2  0.051319  0.039858  5.622636  10.12659  0.829356  83.38156 
 3  0.054849  0.042178  5.798013  11.26999  0.753350  82.13647 
 4  0.056170  0.044401  6.059110  11.32620  0.727049  81.84324 
 5  0.056751  0.044186  6.087969  11.52385  0.716304  81.62769 
 6  0.056965  0.044956  6.127483  11.52439  0.712300  81.59087 
 7  0.057063  0.044832  6.131971  11.55965  0.710545  81.55301 
 8  0.057099  0.045074  6.138580  11.55894  0.709881  81.54752 
 9  0.057115  0.045048  6.139303  11.56528  0.709586  81.54079 
 10  0.057121  0.045116  6.140414  11.56505  0.709474  81.53995 
       
       Factorization: 
Structural       
       






Case 4.2: Non recursive ordering  
The Hessian was near singular and therefore the software cannot give me the result. 
 
